Mens rea is required for licence-condition breaches under essential supplies law absent clear statutory exclusion.

Mens rea remained an essential ingredient for contravention under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 because the provision did not clearly exclude guilty intention by express words or necessary implication. The discussion also notes that the presence of a separate clause requiring knowledge or reasonable belief for false statements did not convert breach of licence conditions into absolute liability. On the facts described, the prosecution did not prove that the proprietor knew the fortnightly returns were false, as the statements were prepared and submitted by the manager and the surrounding evidence was insufficient. The acquittal was therefore upheld on the basis that liability was not established without proof of knowledge or guilty intention.

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Issues: (i) whether mens rea was an essential ingredient for contravention punishable under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 in relation to breach of the licence conditions; (ii) whether the prosecution proved that the respondent had knowledge of the falsity of the fortnightly statements so as to fasten liability.

Issue (i): whether mens rea was an essential ingredient for contravention punishable under Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 in relation to breach of the licence conditions.

Analysis: The general rule of criminal law is that guilty intention is an ingredient of an offence unless excluded by express words or necessary implication. Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 uses wide language and does not itself exclude mens rea. The presence of Section 10, which expressly requires knowledge or reasonable belief for false statements, does not justify reading Section 7 as imposing absolute liability for the same conduct. The nature of the control order and the licence conditions did not show that the duty was absolute so as to dispense with proof of guilty mind.

Conclusion: Mens rea was not excluded, and liability under Section 7 could not be imposed without proof of knowledge or guilty intention.

Issue (ii): whether the prosecution proved that the respondent had knowledge of the falsity of the fortnightly statements so as to fasten liability.

Analysis: The evidence showed that the statements were prepared and submitted by the manager, and the material relied upon by the prosecution was insufficient to establish that the respondent knew the statements were false. The facts relied on, including occasional presence at Banaras, banking transactions, and oral testimony, did not displace the finding that he had no knowledge of the incorrect returns. In criminal liability, absent proof of such knowledge or personal participation, the proprietor could not be convicted merely because the business was carried on in his name.

Conclusion: The prosecution failed to prove the respondent's knowledge of the falsity of the returns, so conviction was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal was upheld and the State's appeals were rejected because the offence was not established without proof of mens rea or knowledge.

Ratio Decidendi: Unless a statute clearly excludes it by express words or necessary implication, mens rea remains an essential ingredient of a criminal offence, and liability for breach of control-order conditions cannot be imposed in the absence of proof of knowledge or guilty intention.

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