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Issues: (i) Whether gratuity payable by the employer to a deceased employee, and lying with the employer in the hands of the decree-holder, was exempt from attachment in execution of a decree under Section 60(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) whether the earlier order recording that the gratuity was not attachable operated as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings.
Issue (i): Whether gratuity payable by the employer to a deceased employee, and lying with the employer in the hands of the decree-holder, was exempt from attachment in execution of a decree under Section 60(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Analysis: Section 60(g) exempts provident fund and gratuities payable to an employee, but the exemption is directed to gratuity payable to the employee. Once the employee had died, the gratuity could not be treated as a benefit still payable to him. On the facts, the amount was payable to the legal heirs and, if the employer was legally bound to pay it, the amount assumed the character of a debt due to the heirs and was attachable in the employer's hands. The earlier protective order was not shown to rest on any rule making the gratuity a mere discretionary bounty.
Conclusion: The gratuity amount was liable to attachment and no refund could be ordered in favour of the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether the earlier order recording that the gratuity was not attachable operated as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings.
Analysis: A pure question of law, especially one going to the court's power or jurisdiction to pass an attachment order, does not operate as res judicata merely because it was previously decided between the parties. The earlier order turned on the interpretation of the statutory exemption in Section 60(g) and therefore did not bar reconsideration in the later execution proceedings.
Conclusion: The plea of res judicata failed and the earlier attachment order did not prevent the court from holding the amount attachable.
Final Conclusion: The appeal raised no merit, as the gratuity payable after the employee's death was attachable in the employer's hands and the prior order did not create a res judicata bar; the decree-holder was not required to refund the amount.
Ratio Decidendi: A gratuity payable by an employer after the employee's death, when legally due to the heirs, is not protected from attachment under Section 60(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and an erroneous prior ruling on such a question of law does not operate as res judicata.