2009 (8) TMI 1177 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court sets aside judgment, allows appeal for fresh land acquisition notification.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 21.01.2008. It permitted the State of Maharashtra to issue a ... Notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act') was issued in respect of the land in question on 29.8.2002 - Thereafter a Notification u/s 6 was issued on 18.6.2003. The said Notification u/s 6 was challenged and the writ petition filed by the appellants was allowed on 20.1.2004 - Notification u/s 6 dated 18.06.2003 was quashed - Subsequently a second Notification u/s 6 dated 30.10.2006 was issued - Validity of Notification u/s 6 dated 30.10.2006 - HELD THAT:- In our opinion, the said Notification was clearly barred by clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6. It can be seen from the proviso to Section 6 that it is couched in negative language. It is well settled that when a Statute is couched in negative language it is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature. In this connection we may also refer to the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation, which were our traditional principles of interpretation for over 2500 years, but which are unfortunately ignored in our Courts of law today. In the Mimansa system illustrations of many principles of interpretation are given in the form of maxims (nyayas). The negative injunction is illustrated by the Kalanja nyaya or Kalanja maxim. The Kalanja maxim (na kalanjam bhakshayet) states that `a general condemnatory text is to be understood not only as prohibiting an act, but also the tendency, including the intention and attempt to do it.' It is thus mandatory. A plain reading of the proviso to Section 6 shows that it is a general prohibition against the whole world and not against a particular person. Hence the Kalanja maxim of the Mimansa system will in our opinion apply to the proviso to Section 6. In fact, a Constitution bench decision of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others Vs. State of T.N. And Others [2002 (3) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT] is clearly in support of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and hence the Notification u/s 6 dated 30.10.2006 is time barred. In our opinion, when the language of the Statute is plain and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the legislature. It is only when the language of the Statute is not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can depart from the literal rule of interpretation. Therefore, there can be no estoppel against a Statute. Since the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 has to be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have no effect. In Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao [2000 (4) TMI 818 - SUPREME COURT] it has been held as follows:- ''The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statute while deciding that issue.” It may be seen from the judgment dated 20.1.2004 of the High Court that in the aforesaid judgment no specific reference has been made to the limitation period prescribed in clause (ii) to proviso to Section 6, though no doubt Section 6 has been generally referred to. Hence, in our opinion, the observations in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment dated 20.1.2004 have to be construed as per incuriam. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 21.01.2008. However, it is open to the respondent-State of Maharashtra to issue a fresh Notification u/s 4 of the Act and take proceedings in accordance with law thereafter. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs. Issues Involved:1. Validity of the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006.2. Applicability and interpretation of the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.3. Effect of previous High Court judgment and estoppel against statutory provisions.4. Doctrine of res judicata and per incuriam in the context of statutory interpretation.Detailed Analysis:1. Validity of the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006:The Supreme Court examined whether the Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, dated 30.10.2006, was valid. The Court concluded that the Notification was barred by clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6, which mandates that no declaration under Section 6 shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4. The Court noted that the statutory language is couched in negative terms, making it peremptory and mandatory.2. Applicability and interpretation of the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:The Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 6, citing principles of statutory interpretation. It referenced authoritative texts and previous judgments to assert that prohibitive or negative words in a statute are ordinarily mandatory. The Court also discussed the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation, highlighting their relevance and depth compared to Western principles. The Mimansa system's classification of negative injunctions was used to reinforce the mandatory nature of the proviso.3. Effect of previous High Court judgment and estoppel against statutory provisions:The respondents argued that the High Court's judgment dated 20.01.2004 allowed for a second Section 6 Notification beyond the statutory period. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that there can be no estoppel against a statute. The statutory period of limitation provided in the proviso to Section 6 must be adhered to, and any concession by counsel cannot override mandatory statutory provisions.4. Doctrine of res judicata and per incuriam in the context of statutory interpretation:The respondents also contended that the earlier High Court judgment constituted res judicata, preventing the appellants from raising the limitation issue. The Supreme Court dismissed this, noting that no statement or concession by counsel can override a mandatory statutory provision. The Court further declared that the observations in the High Court's judgment were per incuriam, as they did not specifically address the limitation period prescribed in the proviso to Section 6. The Court cited precedents to support its position on per incuriam, emphasizing that a decision given in ignorance of a statutory provision or binding precedent does not hold.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 21.01.2008. It permitted the State of Maharashtra to issue a fresh Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and proceed in accordance with the law. The Court reiterated the mandatory nature of the proviso to Section 6 and underscored the importance of adhering to statutory limitations. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.