Detention power under delegated rules and subjective satisfaction were upheld despite joint ministerial approval and pending habeas proceedings.

Delegation under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules did not divest the State Government of its own detention power, so it remained competent to issue the detention order. A detention order was also not invalid merely because it reflected the successive satisfaction of two Ministers and was later authenticated as one composite order. The making of a fresh detention order during pending habeas corpus proceedings did not by itself establish mala fides; absent proof of bad faith, no malice in law arose. The Court further held that the sufficiency of the material underlying the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction was not justiciable, so no infirmity in the basis of detention was shown.

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Issues: (i) Whether the State Government, after delegating powers under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, retained competence to pass an order of detention; (ii) whether a detention order could validly be made on the joint satisfaction of two Ministers; (iii) whether the detention order was vitiated by malice in law because it was made during pending habeas corpus proceedings without fresh consideration; and (iv) whether there was any justiciable infirmity in the material forming the basis of satisfaction for detention.

Issue (i): Whether the State Government, after delegating powers under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, retained competence to pass an order of detention.

Analysis: Delegation does not necessarily amount to a surrender or divestiture of the delegator's own power. The delegation notification was understood as conferring authority on district magistrates without extinguishing the State Government's own power under the rule. The earlier authorities relied upon did not establish that the State Government became incapable of acting under the detention power after issuing the notification.

Conclusion: The State Government remained competent to pass the detention order.

Issue (ii): Whether a detention order could validly be made on the joint satisfaction of two Ministers.

Analysis: The Court rejected the contention that a valid detention order could be made only if all relevant subjects were concentrated in one Minister. It held that successive satisfaction by different Ministers on different grounds, followed by authentication of one composite order, did not invalidate the detention order.

Conclusion: The detention order was not invalid merely because it reflected the satisfaction of two Ministers.

Issue (iii): Whether the detention order was vitiated by malice in law because it was made during pending habeas corpus proceedings without fresh consideration.

Analysis: A fresh detention order made while habeas corpus proceedings are pending is not, by that fact alone, mala fide or an abuse of power. Bad faith or other circumstances showing malice must be proved. On the material before the Court, there was no basis to infer malice, and the record showed consideration by the competent Ministers in accordance with the rules of business.

Conclusion: The detention order was not vitiated by malice in law.

Issue (iv): Whether there was any justiciable infirmity in the material forming the basis of satisfaction for detention.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that, under the detention rule, the satisfaction of the detaining authority on the material before it is a matter for the authority and is not justiciable. The challenge to the sufficiency of the material for maintaining public order therefore could not succeed.

Conclusion: No justiciable infirmity was shown in the material supporting detention.

Final Conclusion: The detention order was upheld and the appeals failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Delegation of detention power does not by itself divest the original authority of its power, and the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority under the detention rules is not open to judicial review absent bad faith or other legal infirmity.

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