Domestic enquiry findings can be ignored only when perverse and unsupported by legal evidence in approval proceedings.

In proceedings for approval of dismissal under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal's role is limited to examining whether the domestic enquiry was proper, natural justice was observed, the employer acted bona fide, and a prima facie case exists. It cannot reappreciate evidence like an appellate court, but it may disregard enquiry findings that are perverse, meaning unsupported by legal evidence. Here, key findings rested on hearsay, conjecture, and unproved prior statements, while crucial facts on the charges lacked evidentiary support. The Tribunal was therefore justified in refusing approval, and the dismissal could not be sustained on those enquiry findings.

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Issues: (i) Whether, in an application for approval under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, an Industrial Tribunal could reappreciate the evidence and disregard the domestic enquiry findings only if those findings were perverse; (ii) Whether the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry against the workman were unsupported by legal evidence and therefore perverse.

Issue (i): Whether, in an application for approval under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, an Industrial Tribunal could reappreciate the evidence and disregard the domestic enquiry findings only if those findings were perverse.

Analysis: The statutory function of the Tribunal under section 33(2)(b) is limited to seeing whether the dismissal is supported by a proper domestic enquiry, whether the principles of natural justice have been observed, whether the employer has acted bona fide, and whether a prima facie case exists. The Tribunal is not to sit as an appellate court over the enquiry officer's assessment of evidence. Findings in a domestic enquiry can be ignored only where they are perverse, meaning that they are unsupported by any legal evidence or are such that no reasonable person could reach them on the material before the enquiry officer.

Conclusion: The Tribunal had no authority to reweigh evidence as an appellate forum, but it could refuse approval if the enquiry findings were perverse for want of legal evidence.

Issue (ii): Whether the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry against the workman were unsupported by legal evidence and therefore perverse.

Analysis: On several material elements of the charges, the finding officer relied on hearsay, conjecture, or material that was not substantive evidence. Previous statements made behind the workman's back could not be treated as substantive proof when the maker did not affirm them in the enquiry. On the second charge also, crucial facts such as the clearing time and the time of presentation of the cheque were found without supporting evidence. Although one limited part of the first charge had some evidentiary basis, the major findings on both charges were not supported by legal evidence.

Conclusion: The findings were substantially perverse, and the Tribunal was justified in refusing approval to the dismissal order.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the enquiry findings, except for a limited factual aspect, lacked legal evidentiary support, and the Tribunal's refusal to grant approval under section 33(2)(b) was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, an Industrial Tribunal may interfere with domestic enquiry findings only when they are perverse in the sense of being unsupported by any legal evidence, and hearsay or unproved prior statements cannot by themselves constitute such evidence.

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