Validating market regulation: rational trader classification, revived rules, and retrospective fee validation upheld under constitutional scrutiny.

A market regulation notification fixing maximum fees was upheld because it did not itself levy fees and any misuse would arise from the bye-law, not the notification. Section 29-B was treated as a valid curative and validating provision, deeming markets established from the relevant date and validating past fee collection and licences without requiring retrospective textual amendment of the original provisions. The A and B class trader classification, the licensing scheme, and the amended Act were held to have a rational regulatory basis and not to violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(g). Rules 65, 66 and 67 were held to revive under the doctrine of eclipse, and section 29-B(3) was upheld against the refund challenge.

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Issues: (i) whether the notification fixing maximum market fees under the Act was discriminatory under Article 14; (ii) whether section 29-B validly cured the defects found earlier in relation to establishment of markets, levy and collection of fees, and licences; (iii) whether the A class and B class trader classifications and the licensing arrangement infringed Articles 14 and 19(1)(g); (iv) whether the Act as amended by the Ordinance became an unreasonable restriction on trade and whether rules 65, 66 and 67 revived; and (v) whether section 29-B(3) was invalid because it prevented refund of licence fees under Article 31(1).

Issue (i): whether the notification fixing maximum market fees under the Act was discriminatory under Article 14.

Analysis: The notification did not itself levy any fee. It only prescribed maxima subject to which the market committee could levy fees. A commodity-wise difference in the mode of levy did not, by itself, amount to discrimination because each agricultural produce could be treated as a separate class. Even if more than one mode were adopted for the same commodity, the vice would arise from the actual bye-law and not from the notification, and the possibility of such misuse was too remote to invalidate the notification.

Conclusion: The notification was not hit by Article 14 and was upheld.

Issue (ii): whether section 29-B validly cured the defects found earlier in relation to establishment of markets, levy and collection of fees, and licences.

Analysis: Section 29-B expressly deemed markets to have been established from the relevant date, validated past actions taken before the Ordinance, and validated fees collected and licences issued before the Ordinance. The provision was a curative and validating measure for past transactions. Retrospective textual amendment of the affected provisions was not necessary where the legislative intent was only to validate prior acts.

Conclusion: Section 29-B was sufficient to validate the past defects and was upheld.

Issue (iii): whether the A class and B class trader classifications and the licensing arrangement infringed Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

Analysis: A class traders were wholesale traders who could buy and sell in the market yard, while B class traders were smaller traders permitted to buy in the market yard and sell retail outside it. The classification had a rational basis, and the lower licence fee for B class traders reflected their different position. The words allowing retail sale were surplusage because retail trade was not controlled under the Act. The licensing arrangement therefore did not amount to hostile discrimination or an unreasonable restraint on trade.

Conclusion: The bye-laws and licensing scheme were valid and did not infringe Articles 14 or 19(1)(g).

Issue (iv): whether the Act as amended by the Ordinance became an unreasonable restriction on trade and whether rules 65, 66 and 67 revived.

Analysis: The amendment did not radically alter the scheme of the Act. The regulatory structure of market areas, market yards, licences, and control of purchases and sales remained substantially the same when the amended section was read with the existing rules. Rules 65 and 67 had originally been valid, became inoperative only because of the earlier inconsistency, and revived once the inconsistency was removed by the amendment, applying the doctrine of eclipse. Rule 66, being consequential, also stood revived.

Conclusion: The Act as amended remained constitutionally valid, and rules 65, 66 and 67 were operative.

Issue (v): whether section 29-B(3) was invalid because it prevented refund of licence fees under Article 31(1).

Analysis: The legislature had power to enact retrospective validating provisions even in fiscal matters. Article 31(1) did not prohibit such validation. Section 29-B(3) retrospectively authorised the levy and collection of licence fees and therefore removed the basis for any refund claim.

Conclusion: Section 29-B(3) was valid and no refund could be claimed on the ground urged.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenges failed on every substantive issue. The validating ordinance and the existing regulatory scheme were held effective, and the impugned market regulation measures were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A regulatory or fiscal measure is not invalid under Article 14 if the classification has a rational basis, and a retrospective validating provision can cure past invalidity without amending the original law retrospectively; rules that were only eclipsed by a later inconsistency revive when that inconsistency is removed.

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