Excessive delegation in tax law invalidates a levy when the executive is left free to fix rates without guiding limits.
The amendment imposing a cess by way of sales tax was not colourable legislation because the Legislature had competence to levy a sales tax and the impost reflected its true character, so that challenge failed. However, the provision was struck down for excessive delegation since it left the rate entirely to the executive without any maximum, minimum, or intelligible guiding policy, amounting to abdication of legislative function. The objections based on non-credit to the Consolidated Fund and alleged Article 14 discrimination were rejected, as the levy was treated as a local tax for a market committee and the classification was supported by the statute's object.
Issues: (i) Whether the amended provision authorising levy of cess by way of sales tax was a colourable exercise of legislative power; (ii) whether the provision was invalid for excessive delegation because the rate of tax was left entirely to the executive without any guiding policy or limits; (iii) whether the levy was unconstitutional for not being credited to the Consolidated Fund and for alleged discrimination under Article 14.
Issue (i): Whether the amended provision authorising levy of cess by way of sales tax was a colourable exercise of legislative power.
Analysis: The amendment was not a mere verbal device. The Legislature had competence under the State taxing entry to impose a tax on sales, and the amended provision was directed to levy a cess by way of sales tax for the purposes of the market committee. The earlier levy had been regarded as tax in substance, and the amendment only adopted the real character of the impost rather than disguising an impermissible fee.
Conclusion: The challenge on the ground of colourable legislation failed.
Issue (ii): Whether the provision was invalid for excessive delegation because the rate of tax was left entirely to the executive without any guiding policy or limits.
Analysis: A taxing statute may validly delegate details, but the Legislature must declare the policy and prescribe an intelligible standard. Here the amended provision conferred uncontrolled authority on the executive to determine the rate of levy, with no maximum, minimum, or guiding principle. The rate of tax was an essential element of the levy, and its complete entrustment to the executive amounted to abdication of legislative function.
Conclusion: The provision was invalid for excessive delegation.
Issue (iii): Whether the levy was unconstitutional for not being credited to the Consolidated Fund and for alleged discrimination under Article 14.
Analysis: The levy was treated as a local tax for the benefit of a market committee functioning as a local authority, so it was not required to form part of the State's general revenues. The selection of notified areas was justified by the object of the legislation, and the absence of an appellate remedy did not by itself create hostile discrimination.
Conclusion: The challenges based on the Consolidated Fund and Article 14 were rejected.
Final Conclusion: The demand for cess could not be sustained because the charging provision suffered from invalid delegation, and the petitioner was entitled to relief.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing provision leaves the rate of levy wholly to the executive without an intelligible policy or statutory limit, the delegation is excessive and the provision is invalid even though the Legislature has competence to impose the tax.