Discretionary revisional power under income-tax law is not amenable to certiorari where statute excludes hearing and prejudice.

A revisional power under section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was treated as discretionary and administrative, so a refusal to interfere was not a prejudicial order and could not be challenged by certiorari on the footing of natural justice. The absence of a hearing did not vitiate the revisional order where the statute had removed any hearing requirement and alternative remedies were available. Delay alone was not a complete bar to writ relief, but it did not assist the petitioner on the merits. The challenge to adding the assessee's share of firm income also failed because the firm income had already been assessed and taxed, leaving the statutory basis for aggregation intact.

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Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition could be refused on the ground of delay alone; (ii) whether a writ of certiorari lay against the Commissioner's order under section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether the omission to grant a hearing vitiated that order; (iii) whether the addition of the assessee's share of firm income in the assessment was without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition could be refused on the ground of delay alone.

Analysis: There was a substantial interval between the Commissioner's revisional order and the institution of the writ petition, but delay by itself was not treated as an absolute bar where the petitioner sought to establish that the impugned action offended principles of justice.

Conclusion: The petition was not rejected solely on the ground of delay.

Issue (ii): Whether a writ of certiorari lay against the Commissioner's order under section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether the omission to grant a hearing vitiated that order.

Analysis: The revisional power under section 33A(2) was construed as a discretionary administrative power. The legislature had removed the earlier requirement of a reasonable opportunity of hearing and had also declared that an order declining to interfere would not be treated as prejudicial to the assessee. In that statutory setting, the refusal to interfere did not amount to a prejudicial order and the rules of natural justice could not be imported as though the authority were acting quasi-judicially. The existence of alternative statutory remedies also weighed against resort to writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: No writ of certiorari lay against the Commissioner's order, and the absence of a hearing did not invalidate it.

Issue (iii): Whether the addition of the assessee's share of firm income in the assessment was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: The Court treated the relevant inquiry under the exemption and aggregation provisions as whether tax had already been paid on the firm's income, not whether the receivers or persons assessed were described in a particular form. On the materials before it, the income of the firm had been assessed and tax had been paid in respect of that income, so the statutory basis for adding the share income for rate purposes was not displaced. The assessee had also not pursued the full statutory appellate machinery available under the Act.

Conclusion: The challenge to the assessment on jurisdictional grounds failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ application failed in substance because the revisional order under section 33A(2) was not amenable to certiorari on the grounds urged, the alleged denial of hearing did not create a legal infirmity, and the assessment challenge could not be sustained in writ jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a revisional power is statutorily made discretionary and administrative, and the statute expressly excludes prejudice and omits any right of hearing, certiorari and natural justice cannot be invoked to challenge a mere refusal to interfere.

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