Statutory presumption in corruption cases is rebuttable where evidence shows the accused was only an intermediary, not the beneficiary.

The statutory presumption under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act applies only when acceptance or obtaining of gratification is proved, and it is rebuttable on the totality of material by showing the presumed fact to be improbable. On the stated facts, the prosecution itself suggested that the appellant merely carried money for another official, was a low-ranking labourer with no role in the underlying allotment or installation work, and was not shown to have taken the amount as a motive or reward for any official act. The required element of intentional aid for abetment was likewise absent, so the essential ingredients of the charged offences were not made out.

---

---

Issues: Whether the statutory presumption under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act could sustain the conviction when the prosecution story itself indicated that the appellant was only an intermediary carrying money on behalf of another person, and whether the ingredients of offences under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were made out.

Analysis: The statutory presumption under section 4(1) operates only where the prosecution proves acceptance or obtaining of gratification in a case falling within its scope, and it is rebuttable by proof of a contrary probability. The burden on the accused is not one of proof beyond reasonable doubt; it may be discharged by showing, on the totality of material, that the presumed fact is improbable. The prosecution evidence here itself attributed the demand to another official and stated that the appellant merely collected the money on that person's instructions. The appellant was a low-ranking labourer with no official role in the allotment of connection or installation work, and the facts did not reasonably support an inference that he accepted the amount as a motive or reward for any official act. On the same footing, the element of intentional aid required for abetment was absent, and the prosecution could not shift its case to a new theory that the appellant had obtained the money for himself or by abuse of official position.

Conclusion: The presumption stood effectively displaced, the essential ingredients of the charged offences were not established, and the conviction could not be sustained.

---