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Issues: (i) Whether the khorposh grants were genuine and bona fide transactions or were made with the object of defeating the Bihar Land Reforms Act and obtaining higher compensation; (ii) Whether the satisfaction required under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a jurisdictional fact open to judicial review in certiorari.
Issue (i): Whether the khorposh grants were genuine and bona fide transactions or were made with the object of defeating the Bihar Land Reforms Act and obtaining higher compensation.
Analysis: The grants were made pursuant to a long-standing compromise between the family members, under which the petitioners gave up claims to self-acquired properties, past maintenance, and a share in the cash balance, in return for khorposh grants. The surrounding materials, including the earlier compromise terms and the contemporaneous letter evidencing the arrangement, supported the genuineness of the transaction. The finding that the grants were a device to defeat the statute was held to be unsupported by adequate material.
Conclusion: The khorposh grants were bona fide and were not made with any intention to defeat the Bihar Land Reforms Act or to obtain higher compensation.
Issue (ii): Whether the satisfaction required under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a jurisdictional fact open to judicial review in certiorari.
Analysis: The power under Section 4(h) depended on the existence of the preliminary condition that the transfer had been made with the prohibited object. That condition went to jurisdiction, and an inferior authority could not conclusively determine its own jurisdiction by an erroneous finding on the foundational fact. The statutory expression requiring the authority to be satisfied was construed as requiring reasonable and objective satisfaction based on adequate material, not a subjective or arbitrary conclusion.
Conclusion: The finding under Section 4(h) was a jurisdictional fact and was open to review; the impugned orders were without jurisdiction.
Final Conclusion: The orders cancelling the khorposh grants and directing surrender of possession were quashed, and the application was allowed with costs.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the validity of an administrative power depends on a preliminary jurisdictional fact, the High Court may review whether that fact actually existed, and a statutory requirement of satisfaction must rest on objective and adequate material rather than subjective assertion.