Impleadment and interim protection in Sarpanch suspension matters: charge-holder not a necessary party, and listing alone does not vacate relief.

In a writ challenge to suspension of an elected Sarpanch, a person placed in charge of the office was held not to be a necessary or proper party, because he had no independent lis, no vested right to the office, and at most could be a witness in any enquiry. The article also notes that an interim order passed after notice does not lapse merely because later dates are listed without the matter actually being taken up; a mere listing is not equivalent to hearing, and the principle that an act of the court should prejudice no one supports continuation of protection. The interim order therefore remained in force until further orders.

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Issues: (i) Whether a person who had been placed in charge of the office of Sarpanch was a necessary or proper party entitled to be impleaded in the writ petition challenging the petitioner's suspension. (ii) Whether the interim order passed earlier in the writ petition had lapsed or stood vacated merely because, on subsequent dates, the matter was listed but did not actually reach for consideration.

Issue (i): Whether a person who had been placed in charge of the office of Sarpanch was a necessary or proper party entitled to be impleaded in the writ petition challenging the petitioner's suspension.

Analysis: The subject-matter of the writ petition was the Government's action under Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 suspending the elected Sarpanch. The person seeking impleadment had no independent lis with the petitioner and no vested right to the office; any charge of office was only by default and not by popular mandate. His asserted role in pointing out alleged illegality would at best make him a witness in any enquiry, not a legally interested party necessary for adjudication.

Conclusion: The application for impleadment was rightly rejected and the applicant was not entitled to be added as a respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the interim order passed earlier in the writ petition had lapsed or stood vacated merely because, on subsequent dates, the matter was listed but did not actually reach for consideration.

Analysis: The interim order had been passed after notice, and the later orders only adjourned the matter while recording that the interim order would continue till the next date. Where the matter did not reach at all, the Court had not applied its mind to the merits on those dates, and it would be unjust to treat the order as having expired by efflux of time. The principle that an act of the Court should prejudice no one supported continuation of the interim protection. A mere listing without actual hearing did not amount to vacating the order, and the exceptional automatic-vacation rule under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India was not attracted on the facts.

Conclusion: The interim order was held to remain in force and was extended until further orders.

Final Conclusion: The impleadment request failed, but the petitioner obtained continuation of the interim protection because the Court held that the order had not lapsed when the matter was not actually taken up.

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