Administrative licence cancellation and natural justice on appeal: relief refused because independent breaches made intervention futile.

Cancellation of an excise licence under the Bengal Excise Act was held to be an administrative, not quasi-judicial, exercise because the scheme did not require notice, hearing, or adjudicatory procedure, and the authority's consideration of the licensee's explanation did not change that character. By contrast, the appellate stage required a judicial approach and was subject to natural justice, so consulting the Superintendent of Excise behind the licensee's back was procedurally irregular. Relief was nevertheless refused because the cancellation rested on independent admitted or proved breaches, making judicial interference futile.

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Issues: (i) Whether the proceeding for cancellation of the excise licence before the Collector was quasi-judicial or purely administrative; (ii) whether the appellate proceeding before the Excise Commissioner was vitiated because the Commissioner consulted the Superintendent of Excise behind the petitioner's back without giving him an opportunity to meet that material.

Issue (i): Whether the proceeding for cancellation of the excise licence before the Collector was quasi-judicial or purely administrative.

Analysis: The relevant statutory scheme under the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 and the licence conditions empowered the granting authority to cancel a licence for breach of its terms. The Act and Rules did not require a judicial approach, prescribed no mandatory notice or hearing for cancellation, and did not oblige the authority to follow any adjudicatory procedure. The mere fact that some enquiry was made, or that the authority considered the licensee's explanation, did not convert the exercise into a quasi-judicial one. The Court distinguished between objective fact-finding in aid of executive discretion and proceedings where the law itself requires a judicial approach.

Conclusion: The proceeding before the Collector was purely administrative, not quasi-judicial.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate proceeding before the Excise Commissioner was vitiated because the Commissioner consulted the Superintendent of Excise behind the petitioner's back without giving him an opportunity to meet that material.

Analysis: The appeal under the Act and Rules required a judicial approach and therefore attracted the requirements of natural justice. Consulting the Superintendent, who was effectively the accuser, without notice to the petitioner, was inconsistent with fair hearing. However, the Court held that interference was not warranted because the other charges were independently admitted or proved, and setting aside the appellate order would be futile since the same result would necessarily follow on the remaining grounds.

Conclusion: Although the appellate procedure was irregular in this respect, no effective relief was granted because the defect was not outcome-determinative.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the cancellation of the licence failed, and the rule was discharged because the impugned action was supportable on independent admitted breaches and judicial intervention would have served no useful purpose.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory cancellation of a licence is left to executive discretion without a mandated judicial procedure, the original cancellation decision is administrative; an appellate stage may nonetheless require observance of natural justice, but certiorari or mandamus will not issue where interference would be futile because the same result is inevitable on independent proved grounds.

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