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Issues: Whether the Magistrate, when issuing summons for offences not specified in Part A of the Fifth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, was to endorse both alternatives under section 130(1), or had a discretion to endorse either alternative.
Analysis: Section 130(1) required a court taking cognizance of an offence under the Act to state upon the summons one of the alternatives mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). The provision used the disjunctive 'or', and nothing in its language compelled the court to endorse both alternatives. Reading the provision as mandatory in that sense would convert 'or' into 'and' and would also produce results inconsistent with the scheme of the Act, because the provision was intended to provide a convenient procedure for minor infractions and not to enable avoidance of more serious consequences by payment of a limited sum. The structure of the Act and the consequences under section 17 also supported a discretionary construction.
Conclusion: The Magistrate was not bound to make an endorsement in terms of section 130(1)(b), and the appeal failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory text uses the disjunctive 'or' and the scheme of the enactment supports alternative procedural options, the provision is not to be read as imposing a mandatory duty to include every alternative.