Estoppel by conduct bars repudiation of a transfer when an agent's signed delivery order induced reliance.

A party is estopped from denying a transfer where its authorised agent signs a delivery order in circumstances reasonably showing assent, and the other side advances money and acts on that representation. The court treated the agent's conduct, viewed in the transaction's context, as sufficient to bind the principal and prevent repudiation after part-delivery of the goods. It also held that estoppel is not confined to sections 115 to 117 of the Evidence Act: those provisions cover one evidentiary form of estoppel but do not exclude other recognised forms, including estoppel by conduct in law and equity. The appeal failed because the defendants could not resile from the induced position.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the defendants, through their agent, were bound by the signed delivery order and were estopped from denying the transfer of the goods to the plaintiffs; (ii) whether the estoppel available to the plaintiffs was confined to sections 115 to 117 of the Evidence Act.

Issue (i): whether the defendants, through their agent, were bound by the signed delivery order and were estopped from denying the transfer of the goods to the plaintiffs.

Analysis: The delivery order was signed by the defendants' agent in circumstances which, viewed reasonably and in the setting of the transaction, were sufficient to show assent to the transfer to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs advanced money on the faith of that assent and the goods were thereafter delivered in part under the order. In such circumstances, it would be inequitable to permit the defendants to resile from the representation made through their agent.

Conclusion: The defendants were estopped from denying the transfer and the finding on liability was against the appellants.

Issue (ii): whether the estoppel available to the plaintiffs was confined to sections 115 to 117 of the Evidence Act.

Analysis: The court held that estoppel is not limited to the evidentiary rule stated in section 115 and the connected provisions. Those sections deal with one class of estoppel operating as a rule of evidence, but they do not exclude other forms of estoppel recognised by law and equity, including estoppel by conduct preventing a party from acting inconsistently with what its conduct induced another to do.

Conclusion: The contention that the Evidence Act exhaustively defined all estoppels was rejected, and the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on estoppel against the defendants.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the defendants, through their agent's conduct, had induced the plaintiffs to act on the transfer and could not afterwards repudiate it.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a party's conduct, through its authorised agent, induces another to alter position on the faith of a transfer or representation, the party is estopped from resiling from that induced position, and the statutory rule of estoppel in the Evidence Act does not exclude other legally recognised forms of estoppel.

---