Supreme Court: 3-day notice for meetings not mandatory under Mysore Town Municipalities Act.

K. Narasimhah Versus H.C. Singri Gowda

K. Narasimhah Versus H.C. Singri Gowda - 1966 AIR 330, 1964 SCR (7) 618 Issues Involved:
1. Whether the requirement of three clear days' notice for holding a special general meeting as per Section 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951, is a mandatory provision.
2. Whether the meeting was improperly held due to the President not presiding over it.
3. Whether the requisition for moving the resolution of no confidence complied with the proviso to Section 23(9) of the Act.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Three Clear Days' Notice Requirement
The appellant contended that the meeting held on October 14, 1963, was invalid as the requisite three days' notice was not served on all the members. The High Court had held that the notices were effectively given on October 10, 1963, despite some members receiving it later. The High Court also opined that the provision for three days' notice was directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation that "sending" the notice equates to "giving" the notice. The Court clarified that "giving" notice is complete when it reaches the hands of the recipient.

The Court examined the legislative intent behind the notice requirement, emphasizing that the main objective is to allow Councillors to arrange their schedules to attend the meeting. The Court noted that the Act provides for shorter notice in cases of great urgency, indicating that the three-day notice was a measure of reasonableness rather than a strict mandate. The Court concluded that the provision of three clear days' notice was directory, not mandatory. The failure to give such notice would only invalidate the proceedings if it prejudicially affected the meeting, which was not the case here, as 19 out of 20 Councillors attended and 15 voted in favor of the resolution.

Issue 2: President Not Presiding Over the Meeting
The appellant argued that the meeting was invalid as he was not allowed to preside, contravening Section 24(1)(a) of the Act. The High Court found no evidence to support this claim and rejected the contention. The Supreme Court agreed, noting that the Vice President took the chair only after the President left the meeting. Therefore, there was no contravention of the requirement that the President shall preside over the meeting.

Issue 3: Compliance with Proviso to Section 23(9)
The appellant asserted that the requisition for the no-confidence resolution did not comply with the proviso to Section 23(9), which requires a 15-day notice of the intention to move the resolution. The High Court did not address this argument, implying it was not pressed during the hearing. The Supreme Court clarified that the 15-day notice requirement applies only to the President, not to all Councillors. In this case, the President received the notice on September 25, 1963, more than 15 days before the meeting on October 14, 1963. Thus, the requirement was satisfied.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the failure to give three clear days' notice to some Councillors did not invalidate the meeting or the resolution of no confidence, as the proceedings were not prejudicially affected. The appeal was dismissed with costs.