Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the recording of the FIR and the ensuing proceedings were vitiated for want of prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police under Section 20-A(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
Analysis: The statutory requirement under Section 20-A(1) was held to be mandatory and intended to prevent abuse of the special statute. Prior approval had to exist at the stage when information about the offence was first recorded by the police. The evidence did not establish that such approval, written or oral, had in fact been obtained before registration of the case, and a subsequent investigation could not cure the initial defect. In the absence of proof of compliance, the entire process founded on the FIR was treated as legally infirm.
Conclusion: The FIR and all subsequent proceedings were held to be vitiated for non-compliance with Section 20-A(1), and the conviction was set aside in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the mandatory statutory safeguard was not satisfied at the inception of the prosecution, rendering the conviction unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute makes prior approval a mandatory precondition for recording information, absence of such approval at the initial stage vitiates the foundational proceeding and cannot be cured by later investigation.