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Issues: Whether the arbitral award could be interfered with, modified, or set aside on the ground of error apparent on the face of the award or misconduct of the arbitrator, and whether the arbitrator's construction of the contract clause governing penalty and short-delivery was open to judicial correction.
Analysis: The Court held that interference with an award is confined to the grounds available under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. A court may set aside an award for misconduct or for an error of law apparent on the face of the award, but it cannot reappraise the evidence or sit in appeal over the arbitrator's assessment. Where the arbitrator gives reasons and adopts one of the possible constructions of the contract, the award is not vulnerable merely because another view is possible. The arbitrator's reading of the contractual clause as requiring proof of actual loss before the penal claim could be recovered, and his assessment of the short-delivery claim on the material before him, were treated as a plausible construction and not as a legal error apparent on the face of the award.
Conclusion: The award was not liable to be interfered with on either of the grounds urged, and the challenge to the award failed.
Final Conclusion: Judicial control over a reasoned arbitral award remains narrow, and a plausible interpretation adopted by the arbitrator cannot be disturbed merely because the court might have reached a different view.
Ratio Decidendi: A speaking arbitral award is immune from interference unless it discloses misconduct or a clear error of law apparent on its face; a court cannot substitute its own construction for a plausible interpretation adopted by the arbitrator.
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