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Issues: (i) Whether the condition in Section 170(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 requiring deposit of the disputed tax before an appeal is heard or determined is constitutionally valid. (ii) Whether the District Judge has jurisdiction to waive the deposit condition, stay recovery of the disputed tax, or otherwise control the hearing of the appeal so as to permit payment before final hearing.
Issue (i): Whether the condition in Section 170(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 requiring deposit of the disputed tax before an appeal is heard or determined is constitutionally valid.
Analysis: The right of appeal is statutory and may be regulated by conditions attached by the legislature. A deposit requirement, by itself, does not offend equality merely because it distinguishes between those who comply and those who default. The statutory scheme of assessment, amendment, and recovery under the Act shows that the pre-deposit condition is designed to balance the assessee's remedy with the Corporation's need for prompt recovery. Read in that context, the provision is not so onerous as to destroy the appellate remedy.
Conclusion: The condition in Section 170(b) is valid and intra vires the Constitution.
Issue (ii): Whether the District Judge has jurisdiction to waive the deposit condition, stay recovery of the disputed tax, or otherwise control the hearing of the appeal so as to permit payment before final hearing.
Analysis: The statutory language bars the appeal from being heard or determined without deposit, but it does not require the appeal to be thrown out at the threshold merely because deposit has not yet been made. The appellate court may regulate the progress of the appeal by adjourning hearing or granting time for payment, but the statute does not confer power to waive the condition or stay recovery pending disposal. The general procedural provision in Section 457 cannot override the specific limitation in Section 170(b).
Conclusion: The District Judge has no power to waive deposit or stay recovery, but may adjourn the hearing or make appropriate interim arrangements to permit payment before the appeal is actually heard.
Final Conclusion: The appellate restriction was upheld, while a limited procedural latitude was recognised to avoid unnecessary hardship without diluting the statutory bar against hearing the appeal on merits without deposit.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory right of appeal may be subjected to a valid pre-deposit condition, and while the appellate authority may regulate the timing of hearing, it cannot override an express statutory bar by granting waiver or stay of recovery contrary to the enactment.