1991 (8) TMI 331 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court affirms validity of notification under new Act, dismisses challenge to transport scheme

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the final notification issued under Section 100(3) of the new Act, dismissing the appellant's challenge to the ... Deemed lapse of proposed scheme due to inordinate delay - saving of pending schemes on repeal - finalisation of pending schemes under Section 100 - computation of limitation period for saved schemes - exclusion of court-ordered stay from limitation - harmonious construction of conflicting statutory provisionsSaving of pending schemes on repeal - finalisation of pending schemes under Section 100 - Whether schemes proposed under Section 68-C of the repealed Act and pending on commencement of the new Act were saved and required to be finalised under Section 100 of the new Act. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 217(2)(e) of the new Act expressly saves schemes made under Section 68-C of the old Act which were pending immediately before commencement, directing that such schemes shall be disposed of in accordance with Section 100 of the new Act. The legislative intent was to keep pending schemes alive for finalisation under the new statutory procedure rather than to let them lapse ipso facto on repeal of the old Act. Consequently pending schemes did not lose efficacy by mere repeal and had to be dealt with under Section 100.Section 217(2)(e) saves pending schemes under Section 68-C of the old Act and they are to be finalised under Section 100 of the new Act.Computation of limitation period for saved schemes - harmonious construction of conflicting statutory provisions - Whether the one-year limitation in Section 100(4) of the new Act applies to schemes published under Section 68-C of the old Act from the date of their original publication or from the commencement of the new Act. - HELD THAT: - There is an apparent conflict between Section 100(4) (which causes a proposal to lapse if not finalised within one year of its publication under subsection (1)) and the saving provision in Section 217(2)(e). Applying the rule of harmonious construction, the Court concluded that Section 100(4)'s one-year limitation governs schemes proposed under the new Act, while for schemes saved under Section 217(2)(e) the one-year period must be computed from the date of commencement of the new Act. That interpretation gives effect to both provisions and avoids rendering the saving provision nugatory.For schemes pending under Section 68-C of the old Act, the one-year period of Section 100(4) is to be computed from the commencement date of the new Act, thus reconciling Sections 100(4) and 217(2)(e).Exclusion of court-ordered stay from limitation - deemed lapse of proposed scheme due to inordinate delay - Whether a period during which publication of an approved scheme was stayed by court must be excluded in computing the one-year period under Section 100(4), and whether the final notification in the present case was within time. - HELD THAT: - The Explanation to Section 100(4) excludes any period during which publication of the approved scheme is held up on account of any stay or order of any court from computation of the one-year period. Applying that provision, the Court found that the appellant had obtained an interim stay from the High Court from May until 9 August 1990; that period must be excluded. On exclusion, the State Government's publication of the final notification on 29 August 1990 fell within the permissible period. The Court also observed that the appellant's own actions (representations that stalled final publication) could not be used to complain of delay.The stay period is excluded in computing the one-year limit under Section 100(4), and on that basis the final notification issued on 29.8.1990 was within time and valid.Final Conclusion: The saved draft scheme under Section 68-C of the old Act was properly finalised under Section 100 of the new Act; the one-year limitation for saved schemes is computed from the commencement of the new Act and excludes periods of court-ordered stay; accordingly the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was upheld and the appeal is dismissed. Issues Involved:1. Nationalisation Scheme Validity2. Delay in Final Notification3. Applicability of New Act Provisions to Old Act Schemes4. Period of Limitation for Finalising SchemesSummary:Nationalisation Scheme Validity:The appellant challenged the nationalisation scheme for the Kota-Sangod route proposed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (old Act). The High Court dismissed the writ petition, and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.Delay in Final Notification:The appellant argued that the undue delay of 11 years in issuing the final notification rendered the scheme invalid. The Supreme Court noted that the delay was caused by the appellant and other operators who approached the Minister for Transport, stalling the notification process. The Court held that the appellant could not complain about the delay he was responsible for.Applicability of New Act Provisions to Old Act Schemes:The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (new Act) came into force on 1.7.1989, repealing the old Act. The appellant contended that the scheme proposed under the old Act lapsed due to the delay in finalisation. The Court referred to Section 217(2)(e) of the new Act, which saves schemes proposed under Section 68-C of the old Act and mandates their finalisation under Section 100 of the new Act. The Court held that the scheme did not lapse automatically and was saved by the new Act.Period of Limitation for Finalising Schemes:The appellant argued that under Section 100(4) of the new Act, the scheme lapsed as it was not finalised within one year from the date of publication. The Court clarified that Section 100(4) applies to schemes proposed under the new Act, not to those under the old Act. For schemes under the old Act, the one-year period should be computed from the date of commencement of the new Act (1.7.1989). The final notification issued on 29.8.1990 was within the prescribed period, considering the stay order obtained by the appellant, which excluded the period of the stay from the one-year limitation.Conclusion:The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the appellant's writ petition and confirming the validity of the final notification issued under Section 100(3) of the new Act. The appeal was dismissed with costs.