Preventive detention rules must stay within the enabling Act; an ultra vires detention order cannot be saved by an ouster clause.

The Defence of India Act, 1939 was upheld as within legislative competence because the Central Legislature's power could be supported by relevant constitutional entries, including preventive detention connected with defence. Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was nevertheless invalid because it exceeded the rule-making power in Section 2(2)(x): the enabling provision allowed detention only on specified grounds of reasonable suspicion, while the Rule authorised detention on a broader executive satisfaction standard. A detention order made solely under that invalid Rule was a nullity and was not protected by Section 16(2), since the ouster clause could not shield an order lacking lawful foundation.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Defence of India Act, 1939 was beyond legislative competence on the ground that "defence of India" was not separately enumerated in the Legislative Lists; (ii) whether Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was within the rule-making power conferred by Section 2(2)(x) of the Defence of India Act, 1939; (iii) whether a detention order made under an invalid rule could be protected from challenge by the bar contained in Section 16(2) of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

Issue (i): Whether the Defence of India Act, 1939 was beyond legislative competence on the ground that "defence of India" was not separately enumerated in the Legislative Lists.

Analysis: The Act was attacked as being ultra vires because defence of India was said not to appear as a distinct entry in the Legislative Lists. The Court held that the competence of the Central Legislature was not confined to an express entry using those words, since several entries in the Lists, and in particular the constitutional power relating to preventive detention for reasons connected with defence, supported legislation on the subject. The challenge to the Act as a whole was therefore rejected, and the provisions were treated as severable to the extent necessary.

Conclusion: The Defence of India Act, 1939 was upheld as within legislative competence, and the contention that it was wholly ultra vires failed.

Issue (ii): Whether Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was within the rule-making power conferred by Section 2(2)(x) of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

Analysis: Section 2(2)(x) authorised rules for apprehension and detention of persons reasonably suspected of hostile origin or of acting, having acted, or being about to act prejudicially in the specified sense. Rule 26, however, permitted detention whenever the Government was satisfied that detention was necessary to prevent a person from acting prejudicially, even without reasonable suspicion of past, present, or imminent prejudicial conduct. The Rule was therefore wider than the statutory source and could not be justified by the more general language in Section 2(1). The Court held that delegated legislation must stay within the limits of the enabling provision and cannot enlarge the substantive power conferred by the Legislature.

Conclusion: Rule 26 was held to be invalid as going beyond the rule-making power under Section 2(2)(x) of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

Issue (iii): Whether a detention order made under an invalid rule could be protected from challenge by the bar contained in Section 16(2) of the Defence of India Act, 1939.

Analysis: The detention order depended entirely on Rule 26. Once the Rule was held to be invalid, the order made under it was a nullity and could not derive immunity from the statutory bar against questioning orders made in exercise of powers conferred by or under the Act. The protection in Section 16(2) did not extend to an order lacking lawful foundation.

Conclusion: The detention order was not saved by Section 16(2) and was open to challenge.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the detention order rested on an invalid rule, and the matter was sent back for the High Court to dispose of the application in accordance with the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Delegated legislation authorising preventive detention is valid only so far as it remains within the precise limits of the enabling provision, and an order made under an ultra vires rule is a nullity not protected by a statutory ouster clause.

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