Territorial jurisdiction under the Amalgamation Order turns on cause of action and offence location, not a fixed Allahabad seat.

The Amalgamation Order confers jurisdiction on the High Court as a whole, while paragraph 14 regulates where that jurisdiction is exercised. It does not create a permanent seat at Allahabad, and the Chief Justice cannot vary the notified Oudh areas from time to time. The second proviso permits already instituted cases from Oudh areas to be heard at Allahabad, but does not authorise original institution there. For civil and Article 226 matters, territorial jurisdiction depends on where the cause of action arises wholly or partly; in criminal matters, it depends on the place of offence or the applicable criminal jurisdiction rules, not on the revisional court's seat alone.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Allahabad seat of the High Court was a permanent seat and whether the Chief Justice could vary the areas in Oudh assigned to the Lucknow Bench from time to time; (ii) the scope of the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, especially whether cases arising in Oudh areas could be directed to be heard at Allahabad only after institution at Lucknow; (iii) the meaning of "cases arising in such areas in Oudh" for civil matters and writ petitions under Article 226, including whether jurisdiction depends on the place where the cause of action first arose or where the appellate or revisional order was made; and (iv) the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench in criminal matters.

Issue (i): Whether the Allahabad seat of the High Court was a permanent seat and whether the Chief Justice could vary the areas in Oudh assigned to the Lucknow Bench from time to time.

Analysis: Paragraph 7 vested jurisdiction in the new High Court as a whole, while paragraph 14 regulated the places where that jurisdiction would be exercised. The language of paragraph 14 did not create a permanent seat at Allahabad, and the word "or" could not be read as "and". The first proviso fixed a Lucknow Bench of not less than two Judges for cases arising in such Oudh areas as the Chief Justice directed, but the power of direction was not a continuing power to enlarge or diminish those areas from time to time. Section 14 of the General Clauses Act did not apply because the Order manifested a different intention.

Conclusion: There was no permanent seat at Allahabad, and the Chief Justice had no power to increase or decrease the Oudh areas from time to time.

Issue (ii): The scope of the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, especially whether cases arising in Oudh areas could be directed to be heard at Allahabad only after institution at Lucknow.

Analysis: The second proviso operated as an exception to the first proviso and concerned cases arising in the specified Oudh areas that were otherwise within the Lucknow Bench's allocation. The word "heard" was held to refer to matters already instituted or filed at Lucknow, and not to the initial filing or presentation of such matters at Allahabad. The Chief Justice's discretion under the proviso therefore enabled transfer for hearing at Allahabad, but did not authorise institution at Allahabad in the first instance.

Conclusion: The Chief Justice could direct already instituted cases or classes of cases from Oudh areas to be heard at Allahabad, but could not require their original institution at Allahabad under that proviso.

Issue (iii): The meaning of "cases arising in such areas in Oudh" for civil matters and writ petitions under Article 226, including whether jurisdiction depends on the place where the cause of action first arose or where the appellate or revisional order was made.

Analysis: For civil matters, the expression was linked to the ordinary notion of cause of action. Where the cause of action arose wholly or partly within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench could be approached, and where it arose wholly outside those areas, Allahabad would have jurisdiction. In writ petitions under Article 226, jurisdiction likewise depended on where the cause of action arose, and not merely on the place where the final appellate or revisional order was passed. If part of the cause of action arose within the Oudh areas, the litigant could invoke the jurisdiction of either Bench according to the facts.

Conclusion: The High Court's restrictive view was rejected, and territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 depended on the actual cause of action, whether wholly or partly within the relevant area.

Issue (iv): The territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench in criminal matters.

Analysis: In criminal cases, jurisdiction was linked to the place where the offence was committed or as otherwise provided by the Criminal Procedure Code. The place where a revisional or appellate order was made did not by itself control jurisdiction. Accordingly, jurisdiction could lie at Lucknow or Allahabad depending on where the offence arose and the applicable jurisdictional rules.

Conclusion: The territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench in criminal matters depended on the place of the offence or the governing criminal jurisdictional rules, not on the seat of the revisional court alone.

Final Conclusion: The interpretation of paragraph 14 adopted by the High Court was modified on the principal jurisdictional questions, especially on the permanency of the Allahabad seat, the power to vary Oudh areas, and the meaning of "heard" in the second proviso, while the matter was remitted for disposal in accordance with the Supreme Court's construction.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Amalgamation Order, jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court as a whole, but its exercise is territorially regulated by paragraph 14; the phrase "cases arising in such areas in Oudh" refers to the ordinary cause of action or criminal cause, and the power to direct a case to be heard at Allahabad does not authorise altering the notified Oudh areas or requiring original institution at Allahabad.

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