Deemed vesting under urban land ceiling law does not equal possession; State must prove lawful taking before repeal saving clause fails.

Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 effects only de jure vesting of surplus land, not automatic de facto possession. Actual possession requires compliance with the separate statutory steps for surrender or delivery under Section 10(5), or forcible dispossession under Section 10(6) if surrender is not made. The Supreme Court's purposive reading treats vesting and possession as distinct stages, so the Repeal Act's saving clause continues to protect the land unless the State can prove that possession was lawfully taken before repeal. Without proof of voluntary surrender or valid dispossession, the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is preserved.

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Issues: Whether deemed vesting of surplus land under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 includes de facto possession, and whether the State can deny the saving protection under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 without proving voluntary surrender or taking of possession under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the 1976 Act.

Analysis: Section 10(3) creates a legal fiction of acquisition and absolute vesting, but the fiction is limited to title and de jure vesting. The statutory scheme distinguishes that consequence from actual possession, because Section 10(5) first authorises the competent authority to require surrender or delivery of possession and Section 10(6) permits forcible dispossession only on failure to comply. The directions issued under Section 35 of the 1976 Act also treat the taking of possession as a separate step after the notification and vesting stage. Reading the provisions purposively, the expression "deemed to have vested absolutely" cannot be expanded to mean that de facto possession has automatically passed to the State. The saving clause in Section 3 of the Repeal Act protects land unless possession had already been taken over in the manner contemplated by the Act before repeal.

Conclusion: Section 10(3) does not by itself amount to taking de facto possession. The State must prove voluntary surrender or valid possession under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) to defeat the saving clause. In the absence of such proof, the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.

Ratio Decidendi: A deeming provision of vesting under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act effects only de jure vesting of title, while actual possession requires compliance with the separate procedures for surrender or dispossession under Section 10(5) and Section 10(6); therefore, the Repeal Act's saving clause is defeated only if possession was lawfully taken before repeal.

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