2001 (9) TMI 1123 - SC - Indian Laws

Specific Performance Suit Not Classified as 'Suit for Land': Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court's decision that a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of ... - Issues Involved:1. Whether a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property is a 'suit for land' under clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.2. The interpretation of 'suit for land' and its applicability to the current case.3. The role of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in determining whether the suit can be considered a 'suit for land.'Detailed Analysis:Issue 1: Whether a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property is a 'suit for land' under clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.The primary question raised in this appeal is whether a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property qualifies as a 'suit for land' under clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The appellant (defendant) argued that since the agreement stipulated the handover of possession upon execution of the sale deed, it should be considered a 'suit for land.' Conversely, the plaintiffs (respondents) contended that the suit did not explicitly claim possession and thus should not be classified as such.Issue 2: The interpretation of 'suit for land' and its applicability to the current case.The term 'suit for land' has been interpreted by various High Courts and the Federal Court. The judgment references several cases to elucidate this point:- In His Highness Shrimant Maharaj Yashvantrav Holkar of Indore Vs. Dada Bhai Cursetji Ashburner, the Bombay High Court held that a suit for specific performance does not fall within the meaning of 'suit for land.'- In M/s. Moolji Jaitha and Co. Vs. The Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., a five-Judge Bench of the Federal Court provided divergent opinions on the meaning of 'suit for land.' Justice Mahajan's view, which the Supreme Court found persuasive, indicated that a suit for specific performance without a claim for possession is not a 'suit for land.'- In Debendra Nath Chowdhury Vs. Southern Bank Ltd., the Calcutta High Court opined that a suit for specific performance of a contract to execute and register a lease with alternative claims for damages is not a 'suit for land.'From these precedents, it follows that a 'suit for land' involves reliefs related to title or possession of immovable property. The Supreme Court agreed with Justice Mahajan's view that a suit for specific performance, without an explicit claim for possession, does not qualify as a 'suit for land.'Issue 3: The role of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in determining whether the suit can be considered a 'suit for land.'Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allows a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to claim additional reliefs such as possession or partition. However, sub-section (2) mandates that such reliefs must be specifically claimed in the plaint. The Supreme Court emphasized that no court can grant relief of possession unless it is explicitly prayed for.In the present case, the plaintiffs did not specifically claim possession of the suit property, which means the suit cannot be treated as a 'suit for land.' The Supreme Court concluded that a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land is essentially for enforcing the terms of the contract and does not involve adjudication of title to the land.Conclusion:The Supreme Court found no illegality in the order of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, which held that the suit for specific performance was not a 'suit for land.' The appeal was dismissed without costs, affirming that the suit for specific performance without an explicit claim for possession does not fall under the category of 'suit for land' as per clause 12 of the Letters Patent.The assistance rendered by Mr. A.S. Bhasme, the learned amicus curiae, was duly appreciated by the court.