Human rights commission eligibility: former police officer excluded, while consultation challenge under the appointment process failed.

A purposive construction of Section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was applied to hold that the required knowledge or practical experience must relate to the protection and promotion of human rights; a former police officer was treated as outside that category because police service is directed to investigation and enforcement, not human rights adjudication, and public confidence concerns were relevant. The recommendation challenge based on consultation under Section 4 also failed: the statutory Committee's recommendation did not require consultation with the Commission's Chairperson, non-participation of one member after notice did not invalidate the process, and no binding convention of mandatory consultation was found, though such consultation was described as desirable.

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Issues: (i) Whether a former police officer is eligible for appointment as a member of the National Human Rights Commission under Section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. (ii) Whether the recommendation for appointment was vitiated for want of effective consultation under Section 4 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 or for absence of a convention requiring consultation with the Chairperson of the Commission.

Issue (i): Whether a former police officer is eligible for appointment as a member of the National Human Rights Commission under Section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.

Analysis: The statutory expression requiring persons with knowledge of or practical experience in matters relating to human rights was construed in the light of the scheme of the Act, the composition and functions of the Commission, and the Paris Principles governing national human rights institutions. The Court held that the relevant experience is experience in the protection and promotion of human rights, not merely experience in investigation or in dealing with crime. Police service is directed to investigation and enforcement, while the Commission is a decision-making body meant to safeguard human rights and inspire public confidence. The possibility of reasonable apprehension in the minds of the public, given the role of police and security forces in human rights complaints, was treated as relevant to the interpretation. On that basis, the provision was read as excluding police officers as a class from appointment under this category.

Conclusion: A former police officer is not eligible for appointment as a member of the National Human Rights Commission under Section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.

Issue (ii): Whether the recommendation for appointment was vitiated for want of effective consultation under Section 4 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 or for absence of a convention requiring consultation with the Chairperson of the Commission.

Analysis: Section 4 requires recommendation by the statutory Committee and does not mandate consultation with the Chairperson of the Commission. The non-participation of one member of the Committee, after notice of the meeting had been given, did not by itself invalidate the recommendation. The Court further held that prior instances of seeking the Chairperson's views did not create a binding convention of mandatory consultation. Although the Court expressed that consultation with the Chairperson would be desirable and should be considered as a healthy convention, it found no legal requirement compelling such consultation on the facts.

Conclusion: The recommendation was not invalidated on the grounds of want of consultation under Section 4 or breach of any binding convention regarding consultation with the Chairperson.

Final Conclusion: The principal challenge succeeded because the impugned appointment was found legally unsustainable on eligibility grounds, while the ancillary challenge based on consultation did not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appointment to a human rights body turns on expertise in human rights, the provision must be construed purposively in harmony with the institution's object and international human rights principles, and not as extending to a class whose primary function is investigation or enforcement in areas frequently implicated in human rights violations.

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