Execution sale of trust property, notice requirements, and strict compliance under Order 21 Rule 89 limit challenge to court sale.

Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act was construed as regulating voluntary dispositions by trustees and not a Civil Court sale in execution of a decree, so the trust property sale was not invalid on that ground. Section 56B did not require notice to the Charity Commissioner because enforcement of a mortgage against trust property was not treated as a proceeding involving a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose. Relief under Order 21 Rule 89 CPC was unavailable because the required deposits were not strictly made, and an agreement to defer or abandon the claim did not amount to actual satisfaction of the decree-holder's entitlement. The text also reiterates that a Single Judge cannot disregard binding coordinate or superior precedents; any departure must be left to a larger Bench.

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Issues: (i) Whether the prohibition in Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act applies to a court sale of trust property held in execution of a decree; (ii) Whether Section 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act required notice to the Charity Commissioner in a mortgage execution proceeding; (iii) Whether the requirements of Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure were satisfied so as to permit setting aside the court sale; and (iv) whether a Single Judge may disregard binding precedents of coordinate or superior Benches on the supposed grounds stated in the judgment under appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the prohibition in Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act applies to a court sale of trust property held in execution of a decree.

Analysis: The prohibition in Section 36 was held to be directed against voluntary acts of trustees, such as a sale, mortgage, exchange, gift, or lease by them, and not against a sale by the Civil Court in execution of a decree for recovery of money due from the trust. The context of the provision, which was placed in the chapter dealing with accounts and audit and imposed restrictions on trustees, supported this construction. The section was not intended to confer an overriding authority on the Charity Commissioner over execution sales conducted by a Civil Court.

Conclusion: Section 36 does not invalidate a court sale of trust property held in execution of a decree.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 56B of the Bombay Public Trusts Act required notice to the Charity Commissioner in a mortgage execution proceeding.

Analysis: Section 56B applies where a suit or legal proceeding involves a question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose. A proceeding to enforce a mortgage against property belonging to a public trust was held not to involve such a question. Accordingly, the proceeding did not attract the statutory obligation to issue notice to the Charity Commissioner.

Conclusion: Notice to the Charity Commissioner was not mandatory under Section 56B in the present execution proceeding.

Issue (iii): Whether the requirements of Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure were satisfied so as to permit setting aside the court sale.

Analysis: Order 21 Rule 89 requires two distinct deposits: five per cent of the purchase-money for the auction purchaser and the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for the decree-holder, subject to any amount already received after the proclamation. Although the trustees deposited the sum payable to the purchaser, the deposit meant for the decree-holder did not satisfy the mortgagee's claim. The argument that the decree-holder's agreement to wait or abandon execution was equivalent to payment was rejected, because the claim was not extinguished and the rule contemplates actual satisfaction of the decree-holder's claim.

Conclusion: The conditions of Order 21 Rule 89 were not fulfilled, and the sale could not be set aside under that rule.

Issue (iv): Whether a Single Judge may disregard binding precedents of coordinate or superior Benches on the grounds stated in the judgment under appeal.

Analysis: The judgment under appeal was held to be contrary to settled principles of judicial hierarchy and precedent. A Single Judge is ordinarily bound by decisions of coordinate Benches, Division Benches, Full Benches, and superior courts. The proper course, if a Judge doubts the correctness of such authority, is to seek reconsideration by a larger Bench through the Chief Justice. References to Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act or the judicial oath did not justify ignoring binding precedent.

Conclusion: Binding precedents of coordinate and superior Benches cannot be ignored by a Single Judge on the grounds stated.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's order was set aside, and the District Court's order was restored because the execution sale was not invalid under the Trusts Act and the requirements for setting aside the sale were not met.

Ratio Decidendi: Provisions restricting transfers by trustees are to be construed as governing voluntary acts of trustees and do not, absent clear language, control court sales in execution of decrees; setting aside a sale under Order 21 Rule 89 requires strict compliance with both statutory deposits; and coordinate or superior precedents are binding unless reconsidered by a properly constituted larger Bench.

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