1969 (10) TMI 73 - SC - Indian Laws

Petition challenging income-tax officers' appointments and seniority dismissed due to pre-constitution actions.

The petition challenging the appointments and seniority of Income-tax officers was dismissed. The Court held that pre-constitution actions could not be ... Non-retrospective operation of the Constitution - inadmissibility of challenge to pre-Constitution acts under Articles 14 and 16 - delay and laches as bar to relief under Article 32 - seniority rules and prospective alteration post Constitution - acquired rights and protection of long standing appointmentsInadmissibility of challenge to pre-Constitution acts under Articles 14 and 16 - non-retrospective operation of the Constitution - Whether appointments and rules operative before 26 January 1950 could be challenged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the Constitution has no retrospective operation and acts validly done before its commencement cannot be attacked under Part III. The appointments to Class I, Grade II made prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, the seniority list as it existed on 1-1-1950 and the seniority rules of 1949 and 1950, insofar as they had effect up to 26-1-1950, could not be impugned under Articles 14 and 16. The Court distinguished the limited principle in Shanti Sarup and subsequent decisions that post Constitution continuance of pre Constitution acts does not, as a matter of course, render those acts vulnerable to fundamental rights challenges; each case depends on whether a post Constitution act effects a fresh deprivation. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the pre Constitutional appointments and the seniority position as at 1 1 1950 were outside the scope of Art. 32 challenge based on Arts. 14 and 16.Pre Constitution appointments and seniority rules/effects up to 26 1 1950 are not amenable to challenge under Articles 14 and 16.Seniority rules and prospective alteration post Constitution - acquired rights and protection of long standing appointments - Whether changes effected by the 1952 seniority rules (post Constitution) could be impugned and, if so, whether the petitioners were entitled to relief. - HELD THAT: - The Court acknowledged that alterations made by the 1952 seniority rules were post Constitution and thus in principle susceptible to challenge under Articles 14 and 16. However, the Court proceeded to consider discretionary and equitable bars to relief. It held that the present petition, attacking the effects of the 1952 rules and the seniority list given effect in 1953, was instituted after inordinate delay. The Court applied established principles that delay and laches may be fatal to relief under Art. 32 in appropriate circumstances, and emphasised the need to protect accrued rights and the stability of long standing appointments and promotions. The petitioners' explanations for delay were found insufficient; prior representations and knowledge of departmental minutes negatived the contention of recent discovery. In consequence, although the 1952 changes were technically post Constitution, the petition was dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the equities disfavouring setting aside long accrued rights.Challenge to changes made by the 1952 seniority rules is barred by inordinate delay and the petition is dismissed on that ground.Acquired rights and protection of long standing appointments - effect of prior decisions on collateral challenges - Whether the decision in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India operates to invalidate the appointments or seniority of those permanently appointed as Assistant Commissioners. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that in Jaisinghani's case the scope of relief was limited and that the earlier decision would not affect Class II officers who had been permanently appointed as Assistant Commissioners. Applying that reasoning, the Court considered it appropriate to leave undisturbed the positions of officers who had long been permanent Assistant Commissioners and whose rights had accrued. This principle reinforced the conclusion that the present petitioners were not entitled to the relief sought after long lapse of time and in the presence of vested rights of the respondents.Jaisinghani's decision does not warrant upsetting the long standing appointments and seniority of permanently appointed Assistant Commissioners in these circumstances.Final Conclusion: The writ petition is dismissed. Pre Constitution appointments and the seniority position as at 1 1 1950 cannot be challenged under Articles 14 and 16; although the 1952 seniority changes were post Constitution, the petition attacking their effects is barred by inordinate delay and the equities require protection of accrued rights. No order as to costs. Issues Involved:1. Alleged breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.2. Validity of appointments and seniority of Income-tax officers.3. Application of pre-constitution actions under Articles 14 and 16.4. Delay in filing the petition under Article 32.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Alleged Breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:The petitioners, confirmed Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax, claimed that their rights under Articles 14 and 16 were infringed due to the irregular and illegal appointments of respondents 6 to 39, who were also confirmed Assistant Commissioners. The petitioners argued that the Government breached the rules governing the service of Income-tax officers Class I, Grade II, by appointing respondents outside the prescribed quota, giving them preferential treatment in seniority and promotions. They relied on the principle laid down in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors. The respondents countered these contentions, with the Attorney General arguing that the acts in question occurred before the Constitution's advent and could not be challenged under Articles 14 and 16.2. Validity of Appointments and Seniority of Income-tax Officers:The petitioners did not challenge the validity of the appointments but contested the recognition of the appointment dates for seniority purposes. They argued that appointments should be post-dated to comply with the quota rule. The Court examined the reorganization scheme and recruitment rules, noting that the Government and Federal Public Service Commission's understanding allowed for selections from existing Grade I officers of Class II Service. The Court found that the appointments were valid and could not be challenged due to pre-constitution actions, inordinate delay, and the acquisition of rights by respondents.3. Application of Pre-Constitution Actions under Articles 14 and 16:The Court emphasized that the Constitution has no retrospective operation. Actions taken before the Constitution's commencement cannot be challenged under Articles 14 and 16. The Court cited Pannalal Binjrai v. Union of India, where it was established that Article 13 has no retrospective effect. The Court distinguished the present case from Shanti Sarup v. Union of India, noting that the latter involved post-constitution actions. The Court concluded that the petitioners could not complain about breaches of Articles 14 and 16 for acts done before the Constitution came into force.4. Delay in Filing the Petition under Article 32:The Court addressed the significant delay in filing the petition, noting that it was brought about 15 years after the 1952 Seniority Rules were promulgated. The Court held that delay could be fatal in certain circumstances, as established in M/s. Tilokchand Motichand's case. The Court emphasized that it must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. The Court found no reasonable explanation for the delay, rejecting the argument that ongoing representations to the Government justified it. The Court concluded that the petitioners' delay in approaching the Court was inordinate and unjustified.Conclusion:The petition was dismissed due to the pre-constitution nature of the challenged actions, the inordinate delay in filing the petition, and the acquisition of rights by the respondents. The Court emphasized the importance of timely legal challenges and the principles of equity, justice, and good conscience.