High Court lacks jurisdiction in Section 115 CPC revision against District Court order under Kerala Building Act.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a revision under Section 115 CPC against an order of the District Court passed under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease & Rent) Control Act, 1965. The Court emphasized the finality clause in Section 18(5) and the prohibition of further revisions under Section 20(1) to expedite rent control proceedings and limit judicial intervention. The dissenting view advocating for High Court's power to entertain a second revision was rejected. The appeals were allowed, High Court orders set aside, and District Judge's revisional orders restored.

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Issues Involved
1. Whether a further revision lies to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against an order of a District Court in revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease & Rent) Control Act, 1965.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

1. Jurisdiction of High Court under Section 115 CPC

The primary issue revolves around whether the High Court can entertain a revision petition under Section 115 CPC against an order passed by a District Court in revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease & Rent) Control Act, 1965 (Kerala Act).

Kerala Act Provisions

- Section 20(1): Allows the District Court to revise orders passed by the Appellate Authority, which is a judicial officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge.
- Section 18(5): States that the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final and not liable to be called into question in any court of law except as provided in Section 20.

Judicial Precedents

1. Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai: Held that a second revision under Section 115 CPC is not permissible after a revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Act. The rationale was that the language of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 impliedly prohibits a second revision to the High Court.

2. Veshesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad: Supported the view that the legislative intent was to curtail multiple revisions to expedite justice and avoid delays.

Conflict in Precedents

- Shyamaraju Hedge v. G. Venkatesha Bhat: Pertaining to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, held that a further revision under Section 115 CPC is permissible. This decision was based on the distinct provisions of the Karnataka Act, which differ from the Kerala Act.

Analysis and Conclusion

The Supreme Court clarified that there is no conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal and Shyamaraju Hedge due to the material differences in the respective Acts. The Kerala Act, having a three-tier system (Rent Control Court, Appellate Authority, and Revisional Court), provides ample opportunity for a party to present their case. The finality clause in Section 18(5) and the prohibition of further revisions under Section 20(1) were emphasized to avoid unnecessary delays and multiplicity of proceedings.

The Court reiterated the view in Aundal Ammal, holding that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a revision under Section 115 CPC against an order of the District Court passed under Section 20 of the Kerala Act. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to expedite rent control proceedings and limit judicial intervention to necessary instances.

Separate Judgment

S. Ranganathan, J.

Justice Ranganathan provided a dissenting view, arguing that the High Court should have the power to entertain a second revision under Section 115 CPC. He emphasized the importance of maintaining consistency in procedural law across similar statutes and highlighted the long-standing practice in Kerala and Karnataka of allowing such revisions. He opined that excluding the High Court's jurisdiction might lead to increased recourse to constitutional remedies, which could ultimately burden the judiciary further.

Final Disposition

The appeals were allowed, and the orders of the High Court under Section 115 CPC were set aside. The revisional orders of the District Judge in each case were restored and became operative. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed as it lacked merit, and interim orders, if any, were vacated. The parties were directed to bear their respective costs.

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