Delegated fiscal power must be prospective unless expressly retroactive; cess notifications were read to cover the full crushing season.

A delegated power to levy cess under the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949 was treated as prospective unless the statute expressly authorised retrospective operation, so a levy for sugarcane crushed before the notification date could not stand. The notifications were construed by their plain language and statutory context as applying to the full crushing seasons named, not merely the post-publication period. Recovery of cess could proceed without a separate prior assessment or demand because the scheme required accounts, returns and payment within time, and sums payable under the provision were recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the Government could, under section 14 of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, levy cess retrospectively for sugarcane brought into and crushed before the date of the notification; (ii) Whether the notifications levying cess for specified crushing seasons were confined to the period after their publication or extended to the entire crushing seasons mentioned; (iii) Whether recovery could be enforced by distraint without a prior assessment or demand.

Issue (i): Whether the Government could, under section 14 of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, levy cess retrospectively for sugarcane brought into and crushed before the date of the notification.

Analysis: The power conferred on the Government by section 14 was held to be a delegated power, and a delegated authority can exercise such power only prospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly authorised. The Act, its scheme, the machinery under section 14(4) and section 17(2)(f), and the rules made under it all pointed to a prospective operation. The absence of any express provision authorising retrospective levy, coupled with the absence of any sensible machinery for enforcing a past-period levy, supported the conclusion that the Government could not impose cess for a period anterior to the notification.

Conclusion: The power under section 14 did not authorise retrospective levy of cess.

Issue (ii): Whether the notifications levying cess for specified crushing seasons were confined to the period after their publication or extended to the entire crushing seasons mentioned.

Analysis: The notifications were construed according to their plain language and context. The reference to the crushing season denoted the whole defined season, and the wording did not support limiting the levy merely to the post-notification part of that season. Punctuation could not control the clear meaning of the notifications, especially where the text and the statutory definition of crushing season showed that the levy was intended to attach to the entire season specified.

Conclusion: The notifications were not confined to the post-publication period and were framed to cover the whole crushing season mentioned.

Issue (iii): Whether recovery could be enforced by distraint without a prior assessment or demand.

Analysis: Under the statutory scheme and rule 11, the occupier was required to maintain monthly accounts, submit returns, and pay the cess within the prescribed time. The cess became payable by force of the rule, and section 14(5) authorised recovery of any sum payable under section 14 as an arrear of land revenue. In that framework, a separate prior demand was not a necessary condition before recovery.

Conclusion: Recovery could be proceeded with without a prior assessment or demand in the manner suggested by the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded because the levy could not operate retrospectively for periods preceding the notifications, and the impugned notifications were quashed to that extent.

Ratio Decidendi: A delegated authority cannot exercise a general power to levy or impose a fiscal burden retrospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly authorised by the parent statute, and taxing notifications must be construed according to their plain statutory language and machinery.

---