Contempt by a judicial officer requires wilful wrongdoing; mere error or excess of jurisdiction is not enough.

A judicial officer is not liable for contempt merely because an order was passed in excess of authority or on an erroneous view of powers. The controlling principle is that contempt requires wilful culpability, meaning conduct actuated by improper or corrupt motive, dishonest intent, or deliberate misconduct. Where the error is only one of judgment, or shows lack of care and caution without extraneous consideration, the penal consequence of contempt does not follow. On the facts discussed, the absence of wilful wrongdoing made the contempt finding unsustainable.

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Issues: Whether a magistrate who passed an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in excess of his authority, but without any corrupt or dishonest motive, could be held guilty of contempt of court.

Analysis: The High Court's findings showed that the magistrate had misconceived his powers and acted without proper care and caution, but there was no finding of extraneous consideration, dishonesty, or wilful misconduct. In proceedings for contempt against a judicial officer, a mere error of judgment or even an order in excess of authority is not enough. Penal consequences arise only where the error is wilful and proceeds from improper or corrupt motives. On the facts found, the necessary element of wilful culpability was absent.

Conclusion: The magistrate could not be held guilty of contempt of court, and the finding of contempt was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The decision establishes that a judicial officer is not punishable for contempt merely because he acted erroneously or beyond jurisdiction; proof of wilful wrongdoing or corrupt motive is necessary.

Ratio Decidendi: Contempt cannot be founded on a mere error of judgment or excess of jurisdiction by a judicial officer unless the conduct is shown to be wilful and actuated by improper or corrupt motive.

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