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Issues: (i) whether the trial court was bound to make the proposed corrections in the recorded evidence of a witness on the basis of an unsigned correction slip and whether refusal to alter the substantive testimony was lawful; (ii) whether the prosecution could be given liberty to recall the witness for further examination after closure of evidence and whether the entire examination of the accused under Section 313 required to be expunged.
Issue (i): whether the trial court was bound to make the proposed corrections in the recorded evidence of a witness on the basis of an unsigned correction slip and whether refusal to alter the substantive testimony was lawful.
Analysis: The statutory scheme governing recorded evidence permits correction only to secure accuracy of the deposition and to enable correction of mistakes when the witness is present. The court may correct errors that are plainly typographical or otherwise necessary, but it is not required to accept changes that would alter the substance of the evidence or allow a witness to depart from the earlier version under the guise of correction. An unsigned and improperly filed correction slip cannot compel substantive modification of testimony. Where the trial judge corrected only obvious typographical mistakes and refused to rewrite the substantive part of the evidence, the procedure substantially complied with the governing provision.
Conclusion: The trial court's refusal to make substantive corrections was justified and the High Court was not right in interfering on this ground.
Issue (ii): whether the prosecution could be given liberty to recall the witness for further examination after closure of evidence and whether the entire examination of the accused under Section 313 required to be expunged.
Analysis: Once the prosecution evidence had closed and the accused had been examined, a direction reserving liberty to recall the witness for further examination was unwarranted in the absence of a proper application and a legal necessity shown by the record. Equally, expunging the whole examination of all the accused under Section 313 was an extraordinary and unnecessary step. If additional incriminating material were later to emerge, the proper course would be to put only those additional circumstances to the accused, not to wipe out the existing examination in toto. The proposal to transfer the case also lost force in view of the changed judicial incumbent.
Conclusion: The liberty to recall the witness and the expunction of the Section 313 examination were unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, the appeal succeeded, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the case expeditiously before the successor judge.
Ratio Decidendi: A criminal court may correct only necessary or typographical errors in recorded evidence and cannot permit substantive alteration of testimony on the basis of an improperly filed correction request; similarly, once the accused have been examined under Section 313, that examination cannot be wholly expunged merely because further evidence may later be sought, unless fresh incriminating circumstances actually arise and require further questioning.