1962 (4) TMI 92 - SC - Indian Laws

Validity of Forward Markets Commission notification under amended bye-law 52AA upheld; dissent on retrospective application

DR. INDRAMANI PYARELAL GUPTA Versus WR. NATHU AND OTHERS.

The court upheld the validity of the notification issued by the Forward Markets Commission under amended bye-law 52AA, rejecting challenges to its ... - Issues Involved:1. Validity of the notification issued by the Forward Markets Commission under amended bye-law 52AA.2. Retrospective application of the amended bye-law 52AA.3. Allegations of malafide intent behind the issuance of the notification.Detailed Analysis:1. Validity of the Notification Issued by the Forward Markets Commission under Amended Bye-law 52AA:The appellants challenged the validity of the notification dated January 24, 1956, issued by the Forward Markets Commission (FMC), arguing that the amended bye-law 52AA, under which the notification was issued, was invalid. The primary contention was that the FMC could not be vested with the power conferred by the amended bye-law 52AA, as it was beyond the statutory powers of the Association and the FMC. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Forward Markets Regulation Act, 1952, and concluded that the power conferred by the bye-law was within the scope of the Act. The court held that the FMC was legally competent to be the recipient of the power conferred by the amended bye-law 52AA. The court further stated that the bye-law was within the bye-law making power under Section 11 of the Act and, therefore, within Section 12.2. Retrospective Application of the Amended Bye-law 52AA:The appellants argued that the amended bye-law 52AA could not operate retrospectively to affect rights under existing contracts. The court analyzed the language of the bye-law and concluded that it was intended to apply to subsisting contracts. The court held that the power to frame a bye-law for emergencies, as provided under Section 11(2)(o) of the Act, included the power to frame one affecting subsisting contracts to resolve crises in forward markets. The court also noted that the contract entered into by the respondents was subject to the bye-laws for the time being in force, and any changes in the bye-laws would be incorporated into the contracts themselves. Therefore, the court rejected the argument that the amended bye-law was invalid due to its retrospective operation.3. Allegations of Malafide Intent Behind the Issuance of the Notification:The appellants alleged that the notification was issued malafide to prevent the Board of Directors of the Association from applying their minds and exercising their judgment as directed by the terms of the Consent Memo. The court examined the affidavit filed by the Chairman of the FMC, which explained the circumstances leading to the issuance of the notification. The court found that the notification was issued to address the detrimental effects of continued trading in futures and was not influenced by any personal motives or malafide intent. The court agreed with the High Court's finding that there was no basis for impugning the notification on the ground of malafide intent.Separate Judgment by Subba Rao, J.:Subba Rao, J., dissented from the majority opinion on two main points:1. Retrospective Operation of Bye-law 52AA: Subba Rao, J., held that the Central Government did not have the power under Section 12(1) of the Act to make a bye-law with retrospective effect. He argued that delegated legislative power does not include the power to make rules or bye-laws with retrospective operation unless expressly conferred by the parent enactment. Therefore, the new bye-law made on January 21, 1956, in so far as it purported to operate retrospectively, was invalid.2. Assignment of Powers to the FMC under Bye-law 52AA: Subba Rao, J., also held that the power assigned to the FMC under the amended bye-law 52AA was beyond the scope of Section 4(f) of the Act. He argued that the duties and powers under Section 4(f) should be read ejusdem generis with the supervisory and advisory functions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 4. Therefore, the power to close out contracts and terminate them was not within the scope of the functions that could be assigned to the FMC under Section 4(f).In conclusion, the majority upheld the validity of the notification and dismissed the appeal, while Subba Rao, J., dissented, holding the retrospective application of the bye-law and the assignment of powers to the FMC under the bye-law as invalid.