Hereditary office limitation: Article 124 failed, Article 120 applied, and completed ouster was not a continuing wrong.

Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies only to a suit for possession of a hereditary office against a defendant in adverse possession of that office, i.e. where rival claimants dispute the office itself. Here, the trustees were not holding the office of hereditary worshipper; they had removed the appellants' predecessors and engaged servants to perform the worship, so Article 124 was inapplicable and the residuary Article 120 governed. Limitation therefore began when the right to sue accrued, at the latest in 1922 when dispossession occurred. Section 23 did not save the suits, because a completed ouster is not a continuing wrong merely because its consequences persist. The suits were barred by limitation despite the merits of the hereditary claim.

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Issues: (i) Whether the suits for declaration of hereditary worshippers' rights and consequential injunction were governed by Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or by the residuary Article 120 of that Act; (ii) Whether Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 saved the suits as involving a continuing wrong.

Issue (i): Whether the suits were governed by Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or by Article 120 of that Act.

Analysis: Article 124 applies only to a suit for possession of a hereditary office against a defendant who is in adverse possession of that office. The office contemplated by the article must be one actually held by the defendant as against the plaintiff, so that the controversy is between rival claimants to the office. On the facts, the trustees were not themselves occupying or performing the office of hereditary worshipper; they had dismissed the appellants' predecessors and had appointed servants to perform the worship. The dispute was therefore not one of adverse possession of a hereditary office within Article 124. Once Article 124 was found inapplicable, the residuary Article 120 governed the suits, and time began to run when the right to sue accrued. That right had accrued at the latest when the appellants were dispossessed under the decree passed in the trustees' suit in 1922.

Conclusion: Article 124 did not apply and the suits fell under Article 120, with limitation commencing at the latest in 1922.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 saved the suits on the footing of a continuing wrong.

Analysis: Section 23 applies only where the wrongful act itself continues as a source of recurring injury. A completed ouster is not a continuing wrong merely because its consequences endure. The trustees' act in denying the appellants' hereditary rights, obtaining possession through litigation, and causing their dispossession was a complete injury at the date of ouster. The subsequent continuance of dispossession was only the effect of that injury and did not amount to a fresh wrongful act from moment to moment. The authorities on continuing nuisance or recurring interference did not assist the appellants, because the present case involved ouster rather than a continuing encroachment of that kind.

Conclusion: Section 23 did not apply and the bar of limitation was not saved.

Final Conclusion: The appellants established their claimed hereditary rights on the merits, but their suits were nevertheless barred by limitation and could not be entertained.

Ratio Decidendi: A suit for hereditary office under Article 124 lies only against a defendant in adverse possession of that office, and where the wrongful act complained of is a completed ouster rather than a continuing wrong, Section 23 of the Limitation Act has no application.

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