Appeal allowed as suit not time-barred; limitation period starts from accrual of right or declaratory decree.

BHAG MAL (ALIAS) RAM BUX & ORS. Versus MUNSHI (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

BHAG MAL (ALIAS) RAM BUX & ORS. Versus MUNSHI (D) BY LRS. & ORS. - 2007 (1) SCR 1114, 2007 (11) SCC 285, 2007 (4) JT 514, 2007 (4) SCALE 603 Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920.
2. Determination of the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession under the said Act.
3. The legal consequence of the abatement of an appeal on the period of limitation.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920:
The case centered on the interpretation of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, specifically regarding the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession of ancestral immovable property. The Act was designed to amend and consolidate the law governing the limitation of suits related to alienations of ancestral immovable property and the appointment of heirs by persons following custom in Punjab. Section 8 of the Act states that a decree declaring an alienation of ancestral property as non-binding shall benefit all persons entitled to impeach the alienation. Article 2 of the Schedule to the Act provides two starting points for the limitation period: the date on which the right to sue accrues and the date on which the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later.

2. Determination of the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession under the said Act:
The appellants contended that the High Court erred in its judgment by not recognizing that the abatement of an appeal gave rise to a new cause of action for filing a suit for possession. The High Court had opined that the period of limitation started running from the date of the declaratory decree (11.4.1969) or the date of Sher Singh's death (25.2.1973), and thus, the suit filed on 3.11.1977 was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date on which the right to sue accrued or the date on which the declaratory decree was obtained, whichever is later. The Court emphasized that different provisions of the Limitation Act should be construed broadly and that the period of limitation could be extended under certain circumstances.

3. The legal consequence of the abatement of an appeal on the period of limitation:
The appellants argued that the abatement of the appeal before the High Court resulted in a new cause of action for filing a suit for possession. The Supreme Court supported this view, stating that the abatement of an appeal, although not an adjudication on merit, results in finality. The Court referred to several precedents, including Abdulla Asghar Alia and Ors. Vs. Ganesh Das Vig [AIR 1933 PC 68], where it was held that an order of abatement gives a new starting point for the period of limitation. The Court further cited Shyam Sundar Sarma Vs. Pannalal Jaiswal and Ors. [(2005) 1 SCC 436], which held that the date of dismissal of an appeal due to abatement serves as the relevant date for the period of limitation. The Supreme Court concluded that the declaratory decree in favor of the respondents attained finality only when the order of abatement was passed on 14.10.1977, thus making the suit filed by the appellants within the limitation period.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court was incorrect in determining that the suit was barred by limitation. The period of limitation should be reckoned from the date on which the right to sue accrued or the date of the declaratory decree, whichever is later. The abatement of the appeal provided a new starting point for the limitation period. Therefore, the suit filed by the appellants was within the prescribed limitation period. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.