Preventive detention and "forthwith" reporting: prompt action, past conduct and instigation of hartal sustained detention orders.

The word "forthwith" in section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was construed as requiring prompt action without avoidable delay, assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances; on the facts, the report was treated as timely because the delay was explained by the disturbed situation and law-and-order duties. Challenges to detention also failed because temporary confinement at one prison did not negate the intended place of detention, past conduct could support an inference of future prejudicial conduct, and instigation of hartal leading to stoppage of work, business and transport could fall within the statutory ground of detention. The detention orders were therefore upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether the report required by section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was made "forthwith"; (ii) whether the detention orders were invalid because the grounds related to past activities, the place of detention was without jurisdiction, or advocacy of hartal could not justify detention.

Issue (i): Whether the report required by section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was made "forthwith".

Analysis: The expression "forthwith" was held to be elastic and to mean prompt action without unreasonable or avoidable delay, having regard to the nature of the act and the surrounding circumstances. It was contrasted with the phrase "as soon as may be" in section 7, and was treated as more peremptory, requiring the report to be sent at the earliest point of time possible. On the facts, the delay was explained by the tense and disturbed situation in Bombay and by the Commissioner's engagement in maintaining law and order, and the delay was found to be unavoidable.

Conclusion: The report was made "forthwith" within the meaning of section 3(3), and the detention was not illegal on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the detention orders were invalid because the grounds related to past activities, the place of detention was without jurisdiction, or advocacy of hartal could not justify detention.

Analysis: The objection as to the place of detention failed because the affidavit showed that the detention was directed to Nasik Prison and temporary confinement at Arthur Road Prison was only pending transfer arrangements. The reliance on past activities was rejected because future conduct may legitimately be inferred from past conduct. The contention regarding hartal also failed because the allegations were not limited to mere advocacy, but to instigation of hartal resulting in stoppage of work, business and transport with a view to promote lawlessness and disorder, which fell within the statutory ground for detention.

Conclusion: These objections were rejected and the detention orders were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The petitions disclosed no legal infirmity in the detention orders, and the challenge to the legality of detention failed in all respects.

Ratio Decidendi: The word "forthwith" in a preventive detention statute means action taken with reasonable promptness and without avoidable delay, judged in the context of the surrounding circumstances, and detention may validly rest on past conduct where it reasonably supports an inference of future prejudicial conduct.

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