1996 (8) TMI 513 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court allows appeal, deems it competent, condones delay, and sets aside Division Bench ruling.

The Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing government of India Versus Shri Mohinder Singh Jagdev & Others

The Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing government of India Versus Shri Mohinder Singh Jagdev & Others - TMI Issues:1. Competency of the appeal filed by the Union of India.2. Explanation for the delay in filing the special leave petition.3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation.Competency of the appeal:The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the appeal filed by the Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing on behalf of the Union of India was competent. It was clarified that the Union of India can be sued under Article 300 of the Constitution, and in suits involving the Central Government, the plaintiff/defendant should be named as Union of India. Despite the nomenclature issue, the Court held that the appeal was properly filed by the Secretary representing the Government of India, and therefore rejected the contention challenging the competency of the appeal.Explanation for the delay:Regarding the delay in filing the special leave petition, the Court considered the circumstances leading to the delay. It was noted that the counsel representing the Union of India failed to inform the Government promptly after the High Court's decision. The Court accepted the explanation provided by the appellants, attributing the delay to the irresponsible conduct of the counsel. Consequently, the Court condoned the delay, emphasizing that the delay should not bar the consideration of the case on its merits.Limitation of the suit:The main issue revolved around whether the suit filed by the respondent was barred by limitation. The Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, specifically Article 58, which governs declarations. The respondent's right to sue first accrued on the date of termination of services, which was on September 10, 1957. As the suit was filed on August 13, 1965, beyond the three-year limitation period, the Court held that the suit was indeed barred by limitation. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the cause of action arose after his acquittal, emphasizing that the employer had the authority to terminate services as per the appointment terms. Referring to previous judgments, the Court clarified that the dismissal order based on the appointment terms was valid and not unconstitutional, thus allowing the appeal and setting aside the Division Bench's judgment.In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Division Bench's judgment, and ruled that the suit filed by the respondent was indeed barred by limitation, based on the termination of services in accordance with the appointment terms.