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Issues: (i) whether the appeal was competent when the memorandum described the appellant as the Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing instead of the Union of India; (ii) whether the special leave petition was barred by limitation or the delay in filing it deserved condonation; and (iii) whether the suit for declaration was barred by limitation, having regard to the date of termination of service and the later acquittal in the criminal case.
Issue (i): whether the appeal was competent when the memorandum described the appellant as the Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing instead of the Union of India.
Analysis: Under Article 300 of the Constitution of India, the Union of India can sue and be sued in relation to its affairs. Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Order 27 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, requires the Union of India to be named as plaintiff or defendant in a suit by or against the Central Government. The Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing was only the departmental limb acting for the Union of India under Article 77 of the Constitution of India, and the description in the cause title was treated as a matter of nomenclature rather than substance.
Conclusion: The appeal was held to be competent, and the objection was rejected.
Issue (ii): whether the special leave petition was barred by limitation or the delay in filing it deserved condonation.
Analysis: The delay was explained by the circumstances in which the Government received the result of the High Court proceedings belatedly through counsel and had thereafter taken steps before filing the petition. The explanation was accepted as sufficient, and the Court declined to treat the delay as a bar to consideration on merits.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the petition was entertained on merits.
Issue (iii): whether the suit for declaration was barred by limitation, having regard to the date of termination of service and the later acquittal in the criminal case.
Analysis: Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, made limitation a matter the Court was bound to notice. The suit sought a declaration, attracting Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, under which limitation of three years begins when the right to sue first accrues. The right to sue was held to have accrued on the date of termination of service, not on the later date of acquittal. The termination was under Rule 5 of the Central Government Services (Temporary) Service Rules 1949, pursuant to the terms of appointment, and not as a dismissal founded on the criminal charge. The temporary servant had no right to the post, and the later acquittal did not furnish a fresh cause of action.
Conclusion: The suit was held to be barred by limitation, and the decree of the Division Bench was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The governing principle is that where a temporary employee's services are terminated under the terms of appointment, the cause of action for declaratory relief arises on the date of termination, and a later acquittal in a criminal case does not extend limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: In a suit for declaration challenging termination of a temporary government servant's service, limitation under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 begins when the service is terminated and not from a later acquittal in criminal proceedings where the termination was independently effected under the terms of appointment.