Liberal construction of sufficient cause permits condonation where supplemental appeals follow a timely composite appeal and bona fide procedural compliance.

Delay in filing supplemental appeals against a composite appellate order may be condoned where the appellant had already filed a timely appeal against the common order and later filed separate appeals only because the Registry required them. The Tribunal applied a liberal construction of "sufficient cause," relying on the appellant's bona fide reliance on prior practice and an earlier Tribunal decision. In the absence of negligence, inaction, or want of bona fides, the delay was held satisfactorily explained and was condoned.

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Issues: Whether the delay in filing the supplemental appeals against a common order disposing of multiple appeals was liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted that a single appeal had been filed within limitation against a composite order and that the supplemental appeals were filed only after the Registry required separate appeals. It noted the prior practice of entertaining one proceeding against a common appellate order, the appellant's bona fide reliance on that practice and on an earlier Tribunal decision, and the absence of negligence, inaction, or want of bona fides. The Tribunal held that, in these circumstances, the expression "sufficient cause" warranted a liberal approach to advance substantial justice, and that the delay in filing the supplemental appeals was satisfactorily explained.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the supplemental appeals was condoned.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellant has acted bona fide by filing a timely appeal against a composite order and supplements that appeal only because of a subsequent procedural requirement, delay in filing the additional appeals may be condoned on a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" in the absence of negligence or want of bona fides.

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