Ex parte restraint on public-interest statutory orders requires strong prima facie grounds; contempt will not lie without a fixed compliance deadline.

Ex parte interim restraint against a statutory order made in public interest should not be granted without hearing the affected authorities unless exceptional circumstances show a strong prima facie case of abuse of power; the Court said the proper course is prompt notice and returnable hearing, and the interim stay was vacated. On contempt, failure to dispose of applications could not amount to contempt where the court had fixed no time-limit for compliance; if expedition was needed, the proper remedy was to seek a further direction fixing time for disposal, and the contempt rule was quashed.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether an ex parte interim stay against a statutory order made in public interest under clause 8-B of the Import Control Order, 1955 was justified; and (ii) whether a rule for contempt could be sustained for non-disposal of applications when no time-limit had been fixed by the court.

Issue (i): Whether an ex parte interim stay against a statutory order made in public interest under clause 8-B of the Import Control Order, 1955 was justified.

Analysis: The relief granted by the High Court had the effect of virtually suspending the operation of a statutory order without hearing the authorities who had made it. Such orders are intended to meet situations affecting public interest, and an interim interdiction of that nature can be granted only on very strong grounds, supported by circumstances showing a strong prima facie case of abuse of power. The Court emphasised that where the principal offices and records are outside the court's jurisdiction, the proper course is to issue notice and make it returnable promptly rather than grant immediate ex parte restraint.

Conclusion: The ex parte interim stay was unjustified and was vacated.

Issue (ii): Whether a rule for contempt could be sustained for non-disposal of applications when no time-limit had been fixed by the court.

Analysis: The stay of the abeyance order entitled the petitioners only to have their applications considered by the competent authorities. Since the High Court had not fixed any time-limit for disposal, failure to decide the applications forthwith could not amount to contempt. If expedition was required, the proper remedy was to seek a further direction fixing a time for disposal, not to invoke contempt jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The contempt rule was unsustainable and was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the interim restraint was set aside, and the contempt proceedings were brought to an end.

Ratio Decidendi: Ex parte interim restraint against a statutory order made in public interest should not be granted without hearing the affected authorities unless exceptional circumstances show a strong prima facie case of abuse of power, and contempt cannot lie for delay in administrative action where the court has fixed no time-limit for compliance.

---