Complaint-case charge test under CrPC sections 245 and 246 and admissibility of Customs statements at charge stage.

In complaint cases, discharge and framing of charge must be tested under Sections 245 and 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not the standard applied to police-report cases, and the evidence must be assessed on whether it could support conviction if unrebutted. The High Court's inherent jurisdiction is not ousted merely because a revision against the charge order is barred, though it remains exceptional and limited to preventing abuse of process or securing justice. Statements recorded by Customs officers under the Customs Act may be relied on at the charge stage if prima facie voluntary. On the record, the material, including foreign-origin goods and the petitioners' admissions, was sufficient to sustain a charge under Section 135(1)(b).

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the High Court could entertain petitions under its inherent jurisdiction after a revision against the charge order had been dismissed under the revisional bar; (ii) whether, in a complaint case, the test for discharge and framing of charge had to be applied under Sections 245 and 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 rather than the test applicable to police-report cases; (iii) whether the statements recorded by Customs officers under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were excluded as involuntary or as confessions made by accused persons; and (iv) whether the material on record was sufficient to justify the charge under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): whether the High Court could entertain petitions under its inherent jurisdiction after a revision against the charge order had been dismissed under the revisional bar.

Analysis: The statutory bar on a second revision did not extinguish the High Court's inherent power, though such power had to be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The mere existence of the revisional bar did not by itself render the petition non-maintainable.

Conclusion: The petitions were maintainable under the High Court's inherent jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): whether, in a complaint case, the test for discharge and framing of charge had to be applied under Sections 245 and 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 rather than the test applicable to police-report cases.

Analysis: The provisions governing discharge and charge in sessions cases, police-report warrant cases, and complaint cases use different language and operate on different materials. In complaint cases, the court must apply the test under Sections 245 and 246, and not the test evolved for Sections 227 and 228. The standard under Section 245 concerns whether the evidence, if unrebutted, would warrant conviction, and only if that test fails can a charge be framed under Section 246.

Conclusion: The revisional court had erred in applying the police-report standard, but the order could still stand if supported on the correct test.

Issue (iii): whether the statements recorded by Customs officers under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were excluded as involuntary or as confessions made by accused persons.

Analysis: The statements were not hit by Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 because, at the stage when they were made, the petitioners were not yet accused persons in law. The surrounding circumstances, the handwriting of the statements, their detail, and the absence of material showing inducement, threat, or promise supported a prima facie conclusion of voluntariness. Sections 161(2) and 164(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not apply in terms to Customs enquiries, and the special regime under the Customs Act prevailed.

Conclusion: The statements were admissible for the limited purpose of considering whether a charge should be framed.

Issue (iv): whether the material on record was sufficient to justify the charge under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The seized goods were of foreign origin and the petitioners' own statements linked them to acquisition, keeping, and dealing in such goods. The cameras were notified goods and were liable to confiscation under Section 111, with the burden of disproving smuggling arising under Section 123. Even apart from that presumption, the material, including the petitioners' admissions, furnished a possible basis for concluding that the goods had been smuggled and that the petitioners knowingly dealt with them. The charge could therefore be sustained on the proper standard.

Conclusion: The charge under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was justified.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the charge orders failed, and the criminal process was permitted to proceed to trial on the existing material.

Ratio Decidendi: In a complaint case, the propriety of framing a charge must be tested under Sections 245 and 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and statements recorded by Customs officers under the Customs Act may be relied upon at the charge stage if they are prima facie voluntary and provide material showing knowledge and dealing with goods liable to confiscation.

---