Separate legal entities and turnover clubbing: common Government ownership alone did not justify aggregation for exemption eligibility.

Separate legal entities could not have their clearances clubbed for exemption eligibility merely because both were Government-owned. The distinct Government company and the appellant were treated as independent units, and common Government ownership did not, by itself, justify aggregating turnover for Notification No. 71/78. On the appellant's own turnover, the exemption limit was not crossed, so clubbing was impermissible and the exemption remained available.

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Issues: Whether the turnover of a distinct Government-owned company could be clubbed with the appellant's turnover for determining eligibility under Notification No. 71/78.

Analysis: The appellant and the other company were separate legal entities, notwithstanding common Government ownership. The mere fact of Government ownership did not justify treating them as one unit for the purpose of aggregating clearances. On the appellant's independent turnover, the eligibility limit for exemption was not exceeded.

Conclusion: The clubbing of turnover was impermissible and the appellant was entitled to exemption under Notification No. 71/78.

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