Standing order modifications turn on fairness and reasonableness; a second show-cause notice before removal was rejected.

Standing order modifications under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act are assessed for fairness and reasonableness, and the power to seek modification is not textually confined to cases of changed circumstances; certification finality does not bar later modification. Provisions requiring reasons on discharge, disposal of appeals within 60 days, and alternative employment for physical unfitness were treated as fair, while a second show-cause notice before removal was held unsupported and unduly dilatory.

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Issues: (i) Whether an application for modification of certified standing orders under section 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 can be entertained only on proof of a subsequent change of circumstances or fresh material, despite the finality attached to certification under section 6; (ii) whether the challenged modifications were fair and reasonable, particularly the requirement of a second show cause notice before removal.

Issue (i): Whether an application for modification of certified standing orders under section 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 can be entertained only on proof of a subsequent change of circumstances or fresh material, despite the finality attached to certification under section 6.

Analysis: The principal reasoning treated the Act as a beneficent measure whose amended scheme widened the inquiry into fairness and reasonableness and expressly gave both employer and workmen the right to seek modification after the statutory waiting period. It held that section 10 contains no words restricting modification to cases of changed circumstances, and that the finality in section 6 means only absence of further appeal or civil challenge, not an absolute bar to later modification. A separate concurring view differed on the source of the limitation, holding that finality under section 6 would be undermined if section 10(2) were used on the same material without any fresh facts or circumstances, and therefore modification should rest on new grounds.

Conclusion: The application for modification is not confined by an express statutory requirement of changed circumstances under the majority view, but the appeal was still allowed in part because only some of the impugned modifications could stand.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenged modifications were fair and reasonable, particularly the requirement of a second show cause notice before removal.

Analysis: The modifications relating to recording and communication of reasons on discharge, disposal of appeals within 60 days, and offering alternative employment in cases of physical unfitness were upheld as fair and reasonable. The requirement of a second show cause notice before removal was found unsupported by ordinary industrial law, unnecessarily dilatory, and not justified by the standard of fairness or reasonableness under the Act.

Conclusion: The first three challenged modifications were upheld and the second show cause notice modification was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to a limited extent by removing the objectionable dismissal-related modification, while the remaining impugned changes to the standing orders were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the amended Standing Orders Act, modification proceedings are governed by the statutory test of fairness and reasonableness and are not textually limited to cases of subsequent change of circumstances; finality under certification provisions does not eliminate the statutory power of modification, though unsupported or unreasonable terms may be struck down.

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