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Issues: (i) Whether Section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 imposed a mandatory obligation on the Provincial Legislature to constitute a tribunal, and whether Section 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 was invalid on that ground; (ii) whether Section 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power; (iii) whether the notification appointing the Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals as the appellate authority was repugnant to Section 9 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910.
Issue (i): Whether Section 296(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 imposed a mandatory obligation on the Provincial Legislature to constitute a tribunal, and whether Section 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 was invalid on that ground.
Analysis: Section 296(2) was read as a transitional provision enabling the Governor to constitute a tribunal to exercise the revenue appellate jurisdiction earlier vested in the Provincial Government, and to continue that arrangement until other provision was made by the Provincial Legislature. The provision did not curtail the legislature's independent power under the Government of India Act, 1935 to make laws on jurisdiction and courts. The words used in the subsection were held not to create a positive mandate compelling the Provincial Legislature to enact a tribunal law in any particular form.
Conclusion: Section 296(2) did not impose a mandatory legislative obligation, and Section 3(3) was not invalid on that ground.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power.
Analysis: The 1948 Act was read as a complete legislative scheme by which the Assam Legislature abolished the earlier tribunal, distributed its appellate and revisional jurisdiction between the Assam High Court and the authority to be appointed under Section 3(3), and provided for pending matters and rules. The use of the word "appointed" was treated as referring to the selection of persons to man an authority already constituted by the legislature. The statute was held to have laid down the essential legislative policy by transferring the jurisdiction in a defined manner and therefore did not leave an uncontrolled legislative function to the Provincial Government.
Conclusion: Section 3(3) did not involve excessive delegation and was valid.
Issue (iii): Whether the notification appointing the Commissioner of Hills Divisions and Appeals as the appellate authority was repugnant to Section 9 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910.
Analysis: The appellate structure under Section 9 of the 1910 Act had already been displaced by later constitutional and statutory arrangements, first under Section 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and thereafter under the 1946 and 1948 Assam enactments. The notification was therefore consistent with the later statutory scheme. Any possibility that the same officer might later hear an appeal from his own order did not invalidate the notification itself.
Conclusion: The notification was not repugnant to Section 9 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 and was valid.
Final Conclusion: The appellate orders were set aside, the validity of the challenged statutory provision and notification was upheld, and the revenue appellate decisions were restored in favour of the State.
Ratio Decidendi: A transitional constitutional provision enabling a temporary appellate tribunal does not, by itself, impose a mandatory duty on the legislature to enact a particular tribunal arrangement, and a statute that itself distributes appellate jurisdiction through a defined scheme does not constitute excessive delegation merely because it authorises the appointment of persons to an authority created by the legislature.