Best judgment assessment requires material evidence; disclosed brick-kiln firing period cannot be rejected on conjecture alone.

Authorities cannot reject a dealer's disclosed brick-kiln firing period and substitute a longer period on conjecture alone. The survey report only indicated that the kiln was closed because of a chimney defect and would be fired after repairs; it did not directly contradict the declared commencement date. As the account books were complete and no discrepancy, incompleteness, or incorrectness was recorded, rejection under the proviso to Section 7(3) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act was not sustainable. A best judgment assessment requires material evidence, not mere inference, and the disclosed firing period was accepted.

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Issues: Whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the disclosed firing period and estimating a longer firing period for the brick kiln on the basis of the survey report, and whether such rejection of the account books was sustainable in the absence of material evidence.

Analysis: The survey report showed only that the brick kiln was closed on account of a chimney defect and that it was expected to be fired after repairs. From that circumstance alone, the authorities inferred that firing had actually commenced on the next day and added 11 days to the firing period. The disclosed date of actual firing was not contradicted by any direct material. The account books were found complete, and no discrepancy, incompleteness, or incorrectness was recorded by the assessing authority. The proviso to Section 7(3) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act permits rejection of the return only when it is incorrect or incomplete. A best judgment assessment cannot rest merely on conjecture when there is no material to discard the dealer's version.

Conclusion: The rejection of the disclosed firing period was not justified, and the disclosed firing period was accepted.

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