Revisional power after repeal cannot survive unless saved; refund claims remain subject to unjust enrichment where tax burden was passed on.

After repeal of a taxing statute, a revisional power under the repealed enactment cannot be exercised unless it is expressly preserved or continued by the successor law; here, the old section 46 power was not saved, so the revisional order lacked jurisdiction. On the refund side, claims cannot be rejected without a statutory basis, but the doctrine of unjust enrichment may still apply where the tax burden has been passed on. The refund rejection was therefore not sustainable as an outright refusal and required limited reconsideration on the passing-on issue.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether, after repeal of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 and commencement of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004, the Commissioner or his delegate could invoke section 46 of the repealed Act to suo motu revise completed assessment orders. (ii) Whether the refund claims could be rejected, including on the ground of unjust enrichment, and whether the refund matter required fresh consideration only on the limited question of passing on of tax burden.

Issue (i): Whether, after repeal of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 and commencement of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004, the Commissioner or his delegate could invoke section 46 of the repealed Act to suo motu revise completed assessment orders.

Analysis: The revisional power under section 46 existed under the repealed Act, but the Value Added Tax Act did not preserve that power on repeal. The later statute deliberately omitted a corresponding revisional power until a subsequent amendment, and the repeal-and-savings provision did not save the old revisional jurisdiction. A power not continued by the new regime could not be exercised after repeal.

Conclusion: The Commissioner, and therefore the Joint Commissioner, had no jurisdiction to revise the assessment orders under section 46 of the repealed Act after the new Act came into force.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund claims could be rejected, including on the ground of unjust enrichment, and whether the refund matter required fresh consideration only on the limited question of passing on of tax burden.

Analysis: Once the revisional exercise was held invalid, the assessment orders stood as validly passed, leaving the refund claims to be tested only under the refund provision of the repealed Act. No statutory ground for rejection under the refund provision was shown to exist on limitation or pending proceedings. However, in a sales tax refund matter, the principle of unjust enrichment could apply if the tax burden had been passed on, and the factual position on that aspect was unclear on the record.

Conclusion: The refund rejection could not stand as an outright rejection, but the matter was sent back for a limited determination of whether the tax burden had been passed on to dealers and distributors.

Final Conclusion: The revisional order was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the refund rejection was set aside with a limited remand confined to unjust enrichment.

Ratio Decidendi: After repeal of a taxing statute, a revisional power under the repealed enactment cannot be exercised unless it is expressly saved or continued by the successor statute; a refund claim may be denied only on statutory grounds and, where applicable, the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

---