Plain meaning in tax entries: "coal" does not include coke or calcined petroleum coke

Entry 17 of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000, which uses only the word "coal", was construed according to its plain and commercial meaning. "Coal" and "coke", including calcined petroleum coke, were held to be distinct commodities, and the Schedule could not be enlarged by adding words not used by the legislature. The Supreme Court authority dealing with an entry expressly covering "coal, including coke in all its forms" was found inapplicable. Applying the rule that ambiguity in a taxing entry must favour the taxpayer, the Court held that Entry 17 did not cover coke or calcined petroleum coke and set aside the entry tax demand.

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Issues: Whether entry 17 in the Schedule to the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000, which mentions "coal", includes "coke" or "calcined petroleum coke" for the purpose of entry tax.

Analysis: The statutory entry was construed on its plain language. The Court held that "coal" and "coke" are distinct commodities in common parlance and commercial understanding. The inclusive expression used in other statutes was absent from the Schedule, and no words could be added to expand the entry. The reasoning in the cited Supreme Court decision concerning "coal, including coke in all its forms" was held inapplicable because the present entry contained only the word "coal". In a taxing statute, ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the taxpayer, and an entry cannot be enlarged by implication.

Conclusion: Entry 17 does not include coke or calcined petroleum coke. The impugned demand for entry tax was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

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