2005 (12) TMI 545 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Court Invalidates Tax on Coke, Emphasizes Distinction from Coal

The court ruled that 'coal' under Entry 17 of the Schedule of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000, does not encompass 'coke.' The order demanding ... - Issues Involved:1. Interpretation of 'coal' under Entry 17 in the Schedule of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000.2. Whether 'coke' falls within the definition of 'coal' for the purposes of entry tax under the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Interpretation of 'coal' under Entry 17 in the Schedule of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000:The petitioner, a private limited company, contended that 'calcined petroleum coke' imported from outside the State of U.P. does not fall within the purview of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act. The assessing authority, however, passed an order relying on the apex court judgment in India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati [1971] 28 STC 603, which interpreted 'coal' to include 'coke' in all its forms. The petitioner argued that the term 'coal' in Entry 17 of the Schedule should be understood in its common parlance and not be extended to include 'coke,' especially since the Schedule does not explicitly mention 'coke' as included within 'coal.'2. Whether 'coke' falls within the definition of 'coal' for the purposes of entry tax under the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000:The court examined the definitions of 'coal' and 'coke' from various dictionaries and legal precedents. It was noted that 'coal' and 'coke' are distinct substances, with 'coke' being a derivative of 'coal.' The court referred to the judgment in the case of India Carbon Ltd., where it was held that 'coal' includes 'coke' in all its forms. However, the court distinguished the present case by pointing out that the Schedule in question does not use the inclusive clause 'including coke in all its forms' for Entry 17, unlike other entries in the Schedule that explicitly include various forms of a substance.The court further referred to the principle of interpretation that in the absence of explicit inclusion, nothing should be added or extracted from the statutory language. It was emphasized that 'coal' and 'coke' are treated as different commodities in common parlance and commercial usage. The court also cited previous judgments, including the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh [1967] 19 STC 469 (SC), which supported the view that terms in a taxing statute should be interpreted as understood in common parlance.The court concluded that the assessing authority wrongly relied on the case of India Carbon Ltd. and held that the term 'coal' in Entry 17 of the Schedule does not include 'coke.' Consequently, the impugned order dated September 26, 2005, was set aside, and the writ petition was allowed.Conclusion:The court held that 'coal' under Entry 17 of the Schedule of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000, does not include 'coke.' The impugned order demanding entry tax on the import of calcined petroleum coke was quashed, and the writ petition was allowed.