Rebuttable presumptions in cheque dishonour cases require only a probable defence, and acquittal stands unless perverse.

In cheque dishonour prosecutions, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are rebuttable, and the accused need only raise a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. Here, the defence was supported by surrounding transaction circumstances, contemporaneous documents, and defence testimony, so the trial court treated the presumption as displaced and held that the complainant had not independently proved the debt. The High Court reversed that acquittal without adequately addressing the trial court's reasoning, but an appellate court should not interfere where two views are possible unless the acquittal is perverse. The conviction was therefore set aside.

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Issues: Whether the presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted on the facts and whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal and convicting the accused under Section 138.

Analysis: The statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are rebuttable and the accused is required only to raise a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. The defence version was supported by evidence, including the surrounding circumstances relating to the sale transaction, the contemporaneous documents, and the testimony of the defence witnesses. The trial court accepted this defence as probable and held that the complainant had not proved the debt independently after the presumption was displaced. The High Court interfered mainly because certain witnesses and documents were not produced, but it did not meet the trial court's reasoning or explain why the defence finding was perverse. In an appeal against acquittal, when two views are possible, interference is not ordinarily warranted.

Conclusion: The presumption was treated as rebutted on a probable defence, and the High Court was not justified in reversing the acquittal. The conviction and sentence were set aside and the accused succeeded.

Final Conclusion: The decision reinforces that in cheque dishonour cases, once the accused raises a probable defence, the burden shifts back to the complainant, and an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal unless the trial court's view is clearly unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the accused may rebut the statutory presumption by showing a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities, and an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal unless the trial court's view is unreasonable or perverse.

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