Moral turpitude in dowry-related conviction supports termination despite suspension of sentence and pending appeal.

Conviction for offences under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was treated as involving moral turpitude, because dowry-related conduct was viewed as inherently base and depraved; on that basis, termination under the banking service rules was justified. Suspension of sentence and pendency of the criminal appeal did not prevent the employer from acting on the conviction, since suspension does not erase the fact of conviction and service action may proceed until the conviction is set aside. If the conviction is later reversed, consequential relief may follow.

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Issues: (i) whether conviction for offences under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 amounted to moral turpitude so as to justify termination under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 read with Paragraph 521(2)(b) of the Shastri Award; (ii) whether suspension of sentence and pendency of criminal appeal prevented the employer from acting on the conviction.

Issue (i): whether conviction for offences under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 amounted to moral turpitude so as to justify termination under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 read with Paragraph 521(2)(b) of the Shastri Award.

Analysis: Section 10(1)(b)(i) empowers a banking company not to employ or continue the employment of a person who has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. The conduct involved in dowry-related offences was treated as inherently base and depraved. The conviction under Section 498-A and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was held to fall within the concept of moral turpitude, and the plea that the matter arose from a private matrimonial dispute was rejected.

Conclusion: The conviction involved moral turpitude and the termination was justified.

Issue (ii): whether suspension of sentence and pendency of criminal appeal prevented the employer from acting on the conviction.

Analysis: Suspension of sentence does not suspend the fact of conviction. The governing principle is that disciplinary or service action may be taken once a person stands convicted, and it is not necessary to await the outcome of the appeal. If the conviction is later set aside, appropriate consequential relief can follow. On that basis, the writ petition was considered premature.

Conclusion: Suspension of sentence and pendency of appeal did not bar action on the conviction.

Final Conclusion: The service termination based on the petitioner's conviction was upheld, and the challenge failed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: An employer may act on a criminal conviction involving moral turpitude notwithstanding suspension of sentence or pendency of appeal, because the fact of conviction remains operative until set aside.

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