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Issues: (i) Whether notices issued under sections 21 and 22 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, could be sustained on the basis of the later reliance placed on the decision concerning toffee and chocolate, when the original assessment had already examined the rate of taxability. (ii) Whether the availability of an alternative statutory remedy barred the writ petitions in the circumstances of the case.
Issue (i): Whether notices issued under sections 21 and 22 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, could be sustained on the basis of the later reliance placed on the decision concerning toffee and chocolate, when the original assessment had already examined the rate of taxability.
Analysis: The power of rectification under section 22 is confined to an error apparent on the face of the record, and reopening under section 21 cannot be founded on a merely debatable issue. The original assessment had considered the taxability of chocolate and toffee, the material placed before the assessing authority, and the relevant judicial and departmental orders, and had reached a conscious conclusion on the applicable rate. The later reliance on the decision in Pappu Sweets and Biscuits could not be treated as a declaration that toffee or chocolate was not sweetmeat for all purposes, because that decision was rendered in the context of an exemption notification under section 4-A and had to be read in its own setting. Since the issue was not one of patent mistake but of disputed classification and rate, the notices under sections 21 and 22 lacked jurisdictional foundation. The same reasoning also applied to the attempted reopening regarding refined mustard oil.
Conclusion: The challenge to the notices under sections 21 and 22 succeeded, and the impugned reopening and rectification notices were not sustainable.
Issue (ii): Whether the availability of an alternative statutory remedy barred the writ petitions in the circumstances of the case.
Analysis: The existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Where the controversy turns primarily on questions of law and on the correct understanding of a Supreme Court decision, the Court may still entertain the writ petition. In the petitions where further relief was sought against independent assessment or appealable orders, the Court left the parties to the statutory remedy where appropriate.
Conclusion: The plea of alternative remedy did not bar maintainability in the petitions where the challenge was to the impugned notices, though it justified dismissal in the petitions directed against appealable orders.
Final Conclusion: The common judgment granted relief only to the extent of quashing the notices that sought reopening or rectification on the disputed tax classification issue, while leaving other proceedings and alternative-remedy-based matters undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: A notice under rectification or reassessment cannot be sustained where the underlying tax classification issue had already been consciously considered in the original assessment and the alleged error is at best debatable, especially when the precedent relied upon is context-specific and not a universal declaration on classification.