Statutory appeal limitation cannot be bypassed in writ jurisdiction; delay was not condonable despite illness and short delay.

Statutory appeal limitation cannot be extended in writ jurisdiction merely because Article 226 is invoked. Where the legislature has fixed a time limit for appeal and provided no further extension, the court will not rewrite the statute by adding a grace period. Illness of the person in charge and the shortness of the delay were held insufficient to justify condonation against the statutory bar. The principle that special limitation provisions may exclude the general law of limitation by necessary implication was accepted, and the refusal to condone delay was upheld.

---

---

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal beyond the permissible period could be condoned in writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Analysis: The order held that limitation prescribed by statute applies uniformly and cannot be bypassed merely by invoking writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasised that where the legislature has fixed a time-limit for appeal and has not provided for further extension, the Court should not rewrite the statute by adding a further grace period. The illness of the person in charge was held insufficient to justify ignoring the statutory bar, and the shortness of delay by itself was also held to be no ground for condonation. Reliance on authorities favouring substantial justice was distinguished, and the principle that special limitation provisions may exclude the general law of limitation by necessary implication was accepted.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable, and the Tribunal's refusal to condone it was upheld.

---