Preventive detention in custody upheld where bail likelihood, prompt representation handling, and no prejudice from undisclosed documents were shown.
Preventive detention of persons already in custody is valid when the detaining authority knows of the custody, has reliable material showing a real possibility of release on bail, and reasonably apprehends further prejudicial activity after release; on that basis, custody alone does not invalidate the order. Delay in processing representations will not vitiate detention where the chronology shows prompt movement through the concerned authorities, and a loose use of the word "bailable" does not by itself show non-application of mind. Documents not relied upon in the detention grounds need not be supplied unless their absence causes real prejudice, and technical objections such as alleged discrepancies or retraction issues do not invalidate detention without substantive infirmity.
Issues: (i) Whether the detention orders were vitiated because the detenus were already in custody and the detaining authority lacked material to believe that they would be released on bail and engage in prejudicial activity; (ii) Whether delay in disposal of the representations and the use of the expression "bailable" showed non-application of mind; (iii) Whether non-supply of the requested documents, including search authorisations and airport declarations, impaired the right to make an effective representation; (iv) Whether the declaration under section 9(1) and the other technical objections, including alleged failure to notice retraction and discrepancies in the grounds, invalidated the detention.
Issue (i): Whether the detention orders were vitiated because the detenus were already in custody and the detaining authority lacked material to believe that they would be released on bail and again engage in prejudicial activity.
Analysis: Preventive detention can validly be ordered against a person in custody if the authority is aware of the custody and, on reliable material, reaches a bona fide satisfaction that there is a real possibility of release on bail and, if released, the person is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity. The record showed that the authority knew of the custody, the pending bail applications of co-accused, the normal likelihood of bail in such matters, and the organized and trained manner in which the smuggling activity was undertaken. The inference that the detenus were not ordinary carriers but persons prepared for a continuing smuggling operation was based on existing material.
Conclusion: The detention orders were not invalid merely because the detenus were in custody, and the challenge failed.
Issue (ii): Whether delay in disposal of the representations and the use of the expression "bailable" showed non-application of mind.
Analysis: The representations were processed through the Jail Authorities, the COFEPOSA Unit, the sponsoring authority, and the Finance Minister with explanation for the intervening non-working days. The chronology disclosed prompt movement at each stage, and any postal delay after dispatch could not be attributed to the detaining authority. As to the word "bailable", it was used in a loose, non-technical sense to indicate the practical likelihood of bail, not in the strict meaning of the criminal procedure law. In that context, the expression did not demonstrate absence of application of mind.
Conclusion: There was no inordinate delay and no non-application of mind on these grounds.
Issue (iii): Whether non-supply of the requested documents, including search authorisations and airport declarations, impaired the right to make an effective representation.
Analysis: The detenus were entitled to documents relied upon for the grounds of detention, but not to documents merely incidentally referred to or documents that had no bearing on the detention decision. The airport declarations were not relied upon, and the search authorisations were not part of the material on which the detention grounds were founded. The detenus did not show any actual prejudice or impairment of the right to make a purposeful representation.
Conclusion: Non-supply of those documents did not vitiate the detention.
Issue (iv): Whether the declaration under section 9(1) and the other technical objections, including alleged failure to notice retraction and discrepancies in the grounds, invalidated the detention.
Analysis: The declaration under section 9(1) rested on the same grounds and material already supplied, and there was no requirement that those documents be furnished afresh. The alleged discrepancy regarding the clause number, the variation in valuation, and the complaint as to non-noticing of retraction were all examined and found to be unsubstantial, particularly because the grounds expressly referred to the retraction and the subsequent clarification. None of these technical points showed any legal infirmity affecting the detention.
Conclusion: The declaration and the remaining technical objections did not invalidate the detention.
Final Conclusion: The preventive detention orders and the connected declaration were upheld, and the challenge to them failed in full.
Ratio Decidendi: Preventive detention of a person already in custody is valid when the detaining authority is aware of the custody, has cogent material showing a real possibility of release on bail, and reasonably apprehends further prejudicial activity upon release; documents not relied upon for detention need not be supplied unless their non-supply causes real prejudice.