Limitation for refund claims starts from communication of the appellate order, not the order date, where rights are affected.

Limitation for a refund application under the proviso to section 29-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act runs from the date on which the Tribunal's order is actually or constructively communicated to the assessee, not merely from the date the order is made. Where the refund claim arises from reduction of tax in appeal, the assessee becomes entitled to seek refund under section 29-A(3), and an application cannot be rejected as time-barred if the prescribed period is counted only from the date of the order without proof of communication. The relevant starting point is the date of knowledge where that fact is not disputed.

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Issues: Whether the limitation for entertaining a refund application under the proviso to section 29-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act runs from the date of the Tribunal's order or from the date on which the assessee acquired knowledge of that order.

Analysis: The refund claim arose from reduction of tax on appeal, making the petitioners entitled to seek refund under section 29-A(3) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The assessing authority rejected the applications as time-barred by treating the one-year period in the proviso as running from the date of the appellate order. The Court applied the principle that where a person's rights are affected and limitation is prescribed by reference to the making of an order, the order must be taken to have been made only when it is actually or constructively communicated to the affected party. Since the asserted date of communication and subsequent knowledge was not denied, the date of knowledge was treated as the relevant starting point.

Conclusion: Limitation was held to run from the date of knowledge of the Tribunal's order, not from the date of the order itself, and the refund applications could not be rejected as time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a limitation period for seeking relief is linked to an order affecting rights, the period begins only upon actual or constructive communication of that order to the person aggrieved.

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